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From ‘free rider’ to Riyadh: Obama, Trump and Saudi Arabia  

For most of the Arab Gulf monarchies, the re-election of Donald Trump as the 47th US President provides an opportunity for enhanced security, political and economic cooperation. In his first term, Trump established particularly close ties with leaders in Saudi Arabia, namely Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Muhammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Even after his first presidency, Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner signed a number of business deals with investors from the Gulf to strengthen their personal relations. Based on those ties, some Gulf states expect to benefit from Trump’s mercantile dealmaking approach to promote economic diversification, security cooperation and weapons sales.

After the presidency of Barack Obama, who blamed Saudi Arabia as a “free rider” and signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) with Iran, Gulf states held high expectations that Trump would establish a closer and more trustworthy relationship to join forces against mutual enemies such as Iran. The US under Obama was accused of not providing substantial security protection for the Gulf states from pro-Iranian allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen.

As such, most Gulf states considered the nuclear agreement with Iran as a carte blanche for Iran to intensify its support for regional proxies, undermining the Gulf monarchies’ security interests. Hence, Trump’s hawkish position towards Iran – Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival – and his withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2018 was welcomed in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Furthermore, Trump’s first trip abroad in 2017 took him to Riyadh, where he emphasised the strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Trump’s visit meant a symbolic victory for Muhammad bin Salman to consolidate his power and promote his image as a strong regional leader. It further encouraged the Saudi leadership to join forces with the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to impose a land and sea blockade against Qatar, and accused the Doha leadership of supporting terrorism, Islamism and Iran. Outlined in twelve demands, the ‘blockading quartet’ aimed to sideline Qatar as a relevant regional competitor.

However, all high expectations in the Trump administration did not fully materialise. Due to reservations inside the Trump administration, US support for the Qatar blockade remains more limited than expected by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as Qatar is a strategic ally of the US and hosts the largest US military base in Al-Udaid. Consequently, Qatar adapted to the blockade by pursuing foreign policy diversification towards Turkey, Iran and China and defending its interests towards European and US partners. The blockade was finally lifted in January 2021 in the wake of the election of Trump’s successor, Joe Biden. The lack of US support for the blockading quartet in its isolation efforts of Qatar caused frustration and disappointment in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with the Trump administration.

This sentiment of alienation grew stronger after drone and missile attacks in September 2019 on two Saudi oil refineries, Abqaiq and Khurais, underscored for the Saudi leadership its own vulnerability. After the strikes, the US did not react decisively against the alleged mastermind behind the attacks – Iran – which again showed the Saudi leadership that even under a Trump administration, the US would not serve as a reliable security provider. For Qatar, the initial US backing for the blockade further deepens the mistrust in Trump’s transactionalism, which still features prominently in Qatar’s decision-making circles.

The Gulf and the US: a complicated  relationship

Such events intensified a trend in US-Gulf estrangement, which is not a recent phenomenon: the attacks of September 11, 2001, led to a nadir in US-Saudi relations, as 15 out of 19 attackers came from Saudi Arabia and Osama bin Laden was of Saudi nationality. After 9/11, Saudi Arabia was accused of terror-sponsoring, and 650 families of victims of the attacks filed a lawsuit against Saudi charities, foundations and private individuals, accusing them of having supported terrorism. In response, several Islamic charities were closed, and stricter control mechanisms for religious donations abroad were introduced in all Gulf states in order to prevent terrorist financing.

After the US-led invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the rise of jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, the US-Gulf relationship further deteriorated as the US policy on the Near and Middle East was widely considered as a driver for regional destabilisation. In particular, the fall of Hussein was perceived as a ‘double betrayal’ in parts of the Gulf states: on the one hand, they viewed the US intervention as an effort to weaken autocratic regimes in the Arab world in order to promote democratic values. On the other, the fall of Hussein removed a buffer against Iranian expansion, which increased the Islamic Republic’s strategic depth in Iraq.

Under US President Joe Biden – who called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” during his election campaign – US-Saudi tensions further intensified in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine that started in February 2022. While traditional allies such as the US and Europe had expected the Gulf monarchies to stand up to the Russian aggressor once the war began, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular, stuck to their agreement with Russia within the framework of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+).

Notably, their goal was to not jeopardise their own oil policy by massively lowering prices in order to torpedo Russia’s oil deals, although Biden travelled to Riyadh specifically in the summer of 2022 to convince the Saudi crown prince to back away from Russia.

A new era of reconciliation: Gulf de-risking in light of regional crises

Today, growing mistrust in the credibility of the ‘West’ – and particularly the US – as a reliable security partner shapes the public and political discourse across wide parts of the Gulf region. Since the beginning of the disastrous Israel-Gaza war in October 2023, the ‘West’ has been perceived as a pro-Israeli, neo-colonial actor driven by double standards that neglect key Gulf security concerns.

As a consequence, the Gulf monarchies are self-confidentially developing their own partnership model which is based on pragmatic and opportunistic multi-alignment. In recent years, they have shifted their regional policy-making from confrontation to cooperation, from demonisation to dialogue, and from rivalry to rapprochement. For instance, Saudi Arabia intensified its diplomatic efforts by reaching out to regional rivals such as Qatar, Turkey and – most significantly – Iran. After five rounds of direct talks between Iranian and Saudi security officials that started in 2020 and were facilitated by Iraq and Oman, in March 2023, both countries signed an agreement, facilitated by China, to restore the diplomatic ties that were cut in 2016.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has considered tactical rapprochement with Iran as part of its development policy. To achieve its economic goals, the Saudi leadership therefore needs regional stability to attract foreign investors and establish Saudi Arabia (and the region) as an attractive and secure location for investment. Furthermore, pragmatic ties between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been established, and Bahrain has also normalised relations with Iran. As a consequence, the Gulf region is undergoing a process of de-risking and conflict mitigation and is finding itself in a more autonomous position.

The Trump administration: a double-edged sword

In light of this ‘swing states’ approach, the Gulf states are mainly welcoming the return of Trump, but they don’t react with the euphoria of eight years ago. Today, the region has changed substantially and finds itself in a historical watershed moment due to the ongoing regional conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.

As the Gulf states need to preserve their own stability, legitimacy, and power, they will remain interested and committed to regional de-escalation to prevent an open war between Iran and Israel. In such a volatile situation, the Gulf monarchies will continue to follow a balanced approach of pragmatic connectivity towards global powers such as China and Russia on the one hand, and the US and Europe on the other. This balancing act is driven by the motivation to promote national interests, non-alignment, and a growing reluctance to take sides.

The Trump administration subsequently presents a double-edged sword. Gulf states hope for more assertive engagement from Trump to end the war as he has already promised. He is considered a strong leader who wants to make deals with regional partners and rivals in order to promote his personal reputation and generate business opportunities for US companies as part of his ‘Make America Great Again’ credo. Here, Gulf states’ interests align with Trump’s motivations, as both seek a return on investments along with economic gains.

Conversely, Trump also causes concerns due to his lack of reliability and predictability, as well as his transactionalist appetite. Therefore, the Gulf states are showing an attitude of cautious optimism towards the incoming Trump administration and are watching Trump’s first personal decisions closely.

The Israel-Gaza war: chances and challenges for conflict mitigation under Trump

Regarding the Israel-Gaza war, the binary nature of Trump’s pro-Israeli position is already remarkable. The nomination of figures who wholeheartedly support the government of Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, such as Steve Witkoff as the special envoy to the Middle East, gives key insight into what Trump’s policy to the region could look like. Here, tensions with some Gulf states could emerge: all Gulf monarchies have explicitly expressed their solidarity with Palestine, harshly criticised Israel, and call for both a cease-fire and a realistic pathway for a two-State solution. Illustratively, Gulf leaders such as Muhammad bin Salman accused the Israeli government of “genocide”, while Saudi Arabia has initiated the Global Alliance for a Two-State Solution.

A mainly pro-Israeli Trump administration could thus undermine the Gulf efforts to work on Palestinian statehood; as such, the Gulf states are awaiting the Trump government with mixed feelings.

While scepticism remains due to Trump’s pro-Israeli position, some Gulf states – again, particularly Saudi Arabia – could utilise their leverage on Trump as he aims to achieve normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Since the beginning of the Israel-Gaza war, however, such talks have been put on hold, and Saudi officials have repeatedly emphasised that there will be no resumption of negotiations as long as there is no concrete plan for a two-State solution in sight.

At the same time, the timing of a potential normalisation with Israel is a powerful card up the Saudi leadership’s sleeve against Trump. For example, there is the option of using the perspective of normalisation to persuade Trump to take a tougher stance towards Netanyahu in order to end the war and facilitate concessions for the Palestinians.

From a Saudi perspective, the price of normalisation with Israel has definitely increased. Before October 7, 2023, the focus was only marginally on a two-State solution. In contrast, the emphasis was more on security guarantees, arms deliveries and the US commitment to supporting a civilian Saudi nuclear program. Now, however, the question of a two-State solution has become a political priority for the Saudi leadership – one that can no longer be easily ignored. For Saudi Arabia, too much of its own reputation and credibility is at stake.

Trump, the Gulf and Iran: containment versus cooperation

Regarding Iran, Trump could push the Gulf states to take sides and join an anti-Iranian alliance together with Israel. The reintroduction of Trump’s maximum pressure campaign could thus damage Gulf rapprochement with Tehran. In order to prevent such a scenario, some Gulf states could push Trump to re-enter negotiations with Iran on a nuclear agreement. Publically, Trump could promote anti-Iran propaganda while simultaneously working on a new deal privately, which could result in a contradictory and dysfunctional Iran policy. The potential meeting between tech-billionaire Elon Musk, a close confidant of Trump, and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Amir Saeid Iravani, provides an example of such a hybrid approach.

Trump, like the Gulf states, has little interest in regime change or an open war between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Instead, he has announced plans to negotiate a “better deal” with Iran to force Tehran into making significant concessions. Such a policy could become a delicate balancing act, and the Gulf states will closely monitor the direction Trump takes toward Tehran. For now, it seems likely that they will continue their policy of equidistance and refrain from joining an anti-Iranian alliance.

All Gulf states need to prevent further escalation with Iran – either directly or through its proxies like the Houthis. Instead, the Gulf states might pursue a policy of containment and limited cooperation with Iran, while the US adopts a strategy of containment and pressure – a form of “controlled toughness”.

Europe and the Gulf: finding a modus operandi in times of Trump 2.0

The Gulf states need to manoeuvre smartly between their national interests and Trump’s own calculations. In this delicate situation, they need to preserve their hedging position in a multiplex world order. Hence, the Gulf states might decide to keep their strategic autonomy rather than put all their eggs in Trump’s basket. In this situation, dealing with Trump could also provide an opportunity for enhanced cooperation between the Gulf states and Europe.

For European countries, the Trump presidency will also have significant impacts on energy, security and economic cooperation. For instance, Trump will most likely take a harsh position on environmental regulations by promoting oil, gas and coal industries along with national hydrocarbon production. Such efforts could weaken European motivations to promote its green transition. In turn, he might put pressure on OPEC+, which would potentially undermine Saudi Arabia’s interests.

Therefore, both Europe and the Gulf states should establish closer cooperative ties in promoting energy diversification and green transition in order to join forces in technological knowledge transfer, supply chains and educational exchange. Energy diversification will remain a priority in both Europe and the Gulf states, and concrete partnership models in hydrogen cooperation constitute a relevant pillar in light of Trump’s push for hydrocarbon production.

Another challenge for the Gulf monarchies and Europe could be Trump’s hardline stance toward the People’s Republic of China. Since his first term, China’s economic significance in the Gulf has grown considerably. China has long overtaken the US as the region’s most important trading partner and is increasingly acting as a diplomatic mediator, as demonstrated by its role in facilitating the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Certainly, most European countries are taking a critical position on China, but they remain dependent on trade relations with Beijing. Therefore, growing escalation between China and the US – or the introduction of US penalty duties for companies dealing with China – could undermine the European and Gulf business models. Against this backdrop, closer coordination between the Gulf states and Europe is needed to identify joint opportunities for economic cooperation. In this context, stalled negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement could be continued more constructively, and alternative solutions for improved trade between Europe and the Gulf States, such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), could be found.

Furthermore, a convergence of interest exists in conflict mitigation as both Europe and the Gulf states are promoting closer exchange on a diplomatic and political level, as indicated by the recent GCC-EU summit in Brussels. Here, Trump poses a risk for further regional destabilisation, which could push both Europe and the Gulf states to enhance their security dialogue. Against this backdrop, Gulf officials and representatives from several European states could aim to organise a high-ranking ministerial meeting in order to identify concrete efforts to foster cooperation before Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025.