Security For Deals_ Shifts And Continuities In US-Saudi Relations After MbS Visit to Trump_Sebastian Sons_Dec2025.pdf

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s November visit to the US underscored Saudi Arabia’s goal of maintaining strong ties with the US while asserting strategic autonomy. The trip highlighted significant economic deals, AI cooperation, and security agreements, including the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets, but also revealed limits: Riyadh prioritizes domestic development, regional conflict mitigation, and cautious engagement on sensitive issues like Israel. Trump’s unpredictable, transactional approach thus also creates risks for Saudi long-term planning.

This environment opens a strategic window for Europe. Unlike the US, Europe offers predictable, multilateral, and institutionally grounded diplomacy, complementing Saudi efforts as a platform for dialogue and conflict facilitation. Europe can also support Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 by combining educational, technological, and developmental expertise with Riyadh’s investment-driven model, particularly in AI, renewable energy, and infrastructure, thereby providing a stable, long-term alternative to the unilateral approaches of the US, China, and Russia.

Beyond Washington: Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Pivot toward Multi-Alignment

When Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) visited the United States in November, it marked his first trip in seven years, following a period of ups and downs in the kingdom’s relationship with its most important strategic partner. During the trip, both sides signed several business deals, including a US-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement, a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and progress in critical minerals collaboration, as well as a Memorandum of Understanding in Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Compared with MbS’s last visit to the United States during Donald Trump’s first term, his recent trip reflects notable changes in the Saudi-US relationship. Ties had been strained following the 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, which rendered MbS largely persona non grata in the US and much of Europe. Relations were further tested when Trump offered only limited support to Saudi Arabia amid Iranian attacks on its oil refineries in September 2019 and during the kingdom’s blockade of Qatar alongside the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain from 2017 to 2021. Tensions deepened after Joe Biden’s election, as he took a critical stance on Saudi Arabia, even referring to it as a “pariah” during his campaign.

Today, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has shifted toward partnership diversification, omni-balancing, and strategic autonomy. Strengthened ties with China are evident economically and politically, exemplified by Beijing’s role in restoring Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in March 2023. The kingdom has also positioned itself as a platform for dialogue, facilitating de-escalation in conflicts such as those in Gaza and Ukraine, thereby reinforcing its role as a credible partner for conflict resolution and geoeconomic stability. In strategic terms, the kingdom views the shift towards multipolarity not as a threat but as an opportunity to position itself as an emerging power and as an alternative to traditional global centers of gravity. At the heart of this outlook is a pragmatic foreign-policy approach that emphasizes multi-connectivity, multi-alignment, and multi-balancing. Increasingly, it is no longer a “Saudi first” approach but rather a “Saudi not alone” approach built on flexible partnerships, diversified alliances, and strategic autonomy.

Strategizing relations with the US: Saudi Arabia’s balancing act

Against this backdrop, MbS’s November meeting with Trump highlighted Saudi Arabia’s aim to maintain strong US ties without becoming overly dependent. The visit underscored several key developments in the US-Saudi relationship:

• First, MbS is no longer a newcomer. Unlike his 2018 US visit, when he was consolidating power and ‘Vision 2030’ was in its infancy amid regional instability, he now engages with greater confidence and strategic purpose. This became clear during discussions with Trump when the issue of Saudi-Israeli normalization was controversially discussed. While Trump favors Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords, Riyadh has paused such moves after strong domestic opposition following the Gaza war. The kingdom conditions any normalization on a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, which appears unlikely under Netanyahu’s government. Israeli actions, such as the September attack on Hamas officials in Qatar, further heighten regional and Saudi security concerns. Though no breakthrough on normalization occurred, MbS successfully reinforced his image as an equal and principled player, enhancing his domestic and international reputation.
• Second, business deals matter to keep the spirit of ‘Vision 2030’ alive. Saudi Arabia links political stability with economic growth and continues to advance its ‘Vision 2030’ agenda, aiming to become a hub for technology, tourism, sports, entertainment, AI, and global investment. In this context, MbS announced investments of USD 1 trillion in the US economy, up from the previous USD 600 billion announced during Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia in the summer. Such plans sound challenging amid a time when the Saudi oil-reliant economy suffers from low oil prices and has to scale back some of the giga projects, such as the smart city The Line. For 2026, Saudi Arabia predicts a  budget deficit of USD 44 billion. Therefore, Saudi Arabia prioritizes domestic development and foreign direct investment to achieve ‘Vision 2030’s goals, addressing pressing challenges such as youth unemployment, housing, and infrastructure. This focus limits the kingdom’s international commitments. Nonetheless, recent deals with US companies serve dual purposes: advancing economic diversification at home while strengthening political and economic ties with key US actors. Notably, the Public Investment Fund (PIF) committed USD 55 billion to the US gaming company Electronic Arts (EA). At the same time, the kingdom emphasized that agreements with US companies should deliver mutual benefits: In terms of investment, the US was the largest source of Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Saudi Arabia in 2024. Even before MbS’s trip to Washington, a USD 11 billion lease-and-leaseback agreement for Aramco’s Jafurah gas processing facilities was completed with a consortium led by Global Infrastructure Partners, a BlackRock affiliate. Additional major deals include investments by AWS totaling USD 5.3 billion, Google Cloud as part of a joint USD 10 billion initiative with the PIF, Equinix with USD 1 billion, and Salesforce with USD 500 million. US companies are also playing a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s expanding tourism sector: Hilton recently announced more than 100 hotels operating or planned with a total volume of USD 8 billion, as well as in the asset management industry, with firms such as Templeton and Neuberger Berman increasing their presence. The takeover of the Al-Kholood football club by the US-based firm Harburg Group and plans by Trump’s real estate group to invest in real estate projects in Riyadh’s Diriyya project were additional indicators of enhanced US investment in Saudi Arabia. In particular, sport has emerged as a more relevant field of US-Saudi business ties. The PIF has already made significant US investments, including sponsorships of the FIFA Club World Cup in the US. Through sports diplomacy – highlighted by football superstar Cristiano Ronaldo, who joined MbS on his Washington visit and plays for the Saudi club Al Nasser FC – the kingdom seeks to strengthen US ties and integrate the Saudi and US sports markets, in preparation for hosting the FIFA World Cup 2034.
• Third, the turn towards AI cooperation indicates a shift in Saudi priorities. In recent times, the partnership agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia was primarily driven by the kingdom's oil exports. Interestingly, oil was not discussed during MbS’s trip. Instead, the focus lay on tech cooperation with a special interest in AI. Of the USD 1 trillion investment the kingdom has pledged, the crown prince indicated that USD 50 billion could be allocated solely to developing its AI infrastructure. As the kingdom reassesses projects like The Line, it shifts away from such giga-projects toward sectors like AI, signaling a broader recalibration of Saudi economic priorities. In the field of AI, Saudi Arabia is focusing on building data centers, cloud infrastructure, and AI universities. The current market volume in Saudi Arabia is estimated at USD 2 billion. The kingdom has invested USD 24.8 billion in digital infrastructure over the past six years and plans to spend an additional USD 20 billion over the next five years. Companies such as the PIF-owned AI company HUMAIN or Aramco are establishing themselves as “global champions” in the development of technology-based applications and investing in domestic and foreign markets. HUMAIN secured agreements with leading US companies, including AMD, Cisco, xAI, and Luma, to develop large-scale AI infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, targeting a combined compute capacity of nearly 3 GW and leveraging cutting-edge US technology such as Nvidia chips. HUMAIN has also partnered with Adobe and Qualcomm to develop Arabic-language AI and is teaming up with Global AI to build a data center campus in the US. Ensuring access to US semiconductors is vital for Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to position itself as a global AI hub.
• Fourth, security remains a top priority in bilateral relations. It was announced that Trump would approve the sale of 48 F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, making the kingdom the first country in the Middle East other than Israel to obtain the advanced fighter jets. The US sells the F-35 primarily to formal military allies, such as NATO members or Japan. For Saudi Arabia, such a deal would not only mean a symbolic gesture but a significant step towards technological advancement and military deterrence. If the US were to take such a step – particularly without any Saudi agreement to normalization with Israel – it would signal a major commitment and grant the kingdom a qualitative advantage over its Gulf counterparts, such as the UAE, which refused to buy F-35 jets from the US under the Biden administration. Furthermore, it would cement the traditional security partnership with the US, raising it to a new level. However, uncertainties remain. It was reported that Israel vetoed the F-35 deal if Saudi Arabia would not re-enter negotiations about normalization. Therefore, it seems possible that the kingdom will receive only less advanced versions of the jets to avoid challenging Israel’s Qualitative military edge (QME) which refers to its strategic advantage of maintaining superior military technology, capabilities, and training over any potential regional adversaries in the Middle East to ensure its security. Additionally, Saudi Arabia was designated a non-NATO ally, which consolidates the kingdom’s position as a key security partner for Washington and makes it more than just a political symbol. Vice versa, the US remains the preferred security partner. Nevertheless, deepened security ties with the US do not mean that Saudi Arabia turns away from other defense partners, such as China, as the US might request. Instead, the kingdom will still need to balance its security relations with both rivals, the US and China, to bargain for better deals and preserve strategic autonomy.

Implications for Europe: Providing a multilateral alternative

Saudi-US ties remain central, as the kingdom views the US as its primary economic and security partner. However, Riyadh is asserting greater autonomy, particularly on sensitive issues like Israel, and aims to avoid being perceived as a junior partner or cash cow. While Saudi investments in the US may rise, domestic priorities and efforts to mitigate regional conflict remain central. Trump’s unpredictable, transactional approach presents both opportunities and risks for long-term Saudi planning, prompting the kingdom to favor flexible, “liquid” alliances. Here, in contrast to other players, it is still seen as a credible, stability-focused partner, offering reconstruction expertise, strong trade and investment frameworks, and expertise in educational exchanges. To remain relevant, Europe should thus present itself as a multilateral alternative to the unilateral approaches of the US, Russia, and China in diplomacy, economics, and development.

• Europe is a multilateral alternative in diplomacy: Initiatives like the Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution, co-led by Saudi Arabia and France, demonstrate the potential for enhanced joint diplomatic engagement. Unlike Trump’s transactional, personalized approach, Europe offers a consistent, institutionalized model of mediation. Saudi Arabia increasingly serves as a platform for dialogue and a networker in conflict facilitation but lacks the human and institutional capacity to manage multiple conflicts simultaneously. Thus, European expertise in professional mediation, larger institutional teams, and structured crisis management can complement Saudi efforts. Closer exchanges between diplomats, research institutions, and mediation actors on conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Sudan, or the Horn of Africa could further strengthen the European - Saudi partnership and enhance crisis resolution beyond political-level coordination.
• Europe remains an interesting economic partner for Saudi Arabia: Although business deals with the US peaked after MbS’s Washington visit, Saudi Arabia must seek alternative partners. To achieve its ambitious goals in digitalization, job creation, and localization, the kingdom cannot rely on a single partner. Thus, diversified partnerships with Europe are essential to sustain economic growth and Vision 2030 objectives. Here, the AI domain remains of interest – in particular in terms of skill training and know-how transfer. Saudi Arabia could help Europe diversify its AI technology partnerships and reduce reliance on the US or China by leveraging both investment and strategic advantages, such as location and cheap energy. Projects such as the Italy-UAE “Colosseum” supercomputing hub and the France-UAE 1.4-gigawatt AI campus are strengthening European AI capabilities while operating under European legal and regulatory frameworks. European expertise in education, knowledge transfer, and capacity development remains a key driver for enhanced cooperation. Investments in infrastructure, AI, or critical minerals only support long-term Saudi interests if local human capacities are strengthened. Educational programs like Erasmus+ and the Global Gateway initiative can thus help to develop Saudi talent in AI, biotech, fintech, quantum technologies, renewable energy, climate action, and sustainable engineering, which are fields central to ‘Vision 2030’ and the kingdom’s economic diversification goals.
• Europe could play a relevant role in coordinating reconstruction efforts with Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia shifts from “suitcase diplomacy” to a strategic, investment-driven approach, it links aid, infrastructure, technology, renewable energy, and human capital to long-term economic transformation rather than short-term generosity. The perception of the kingdom as merely a wealthy “ATM” that finances reconstruction in Gaza, Syria, and beyond is misleading. Instead, Europe can complement Saudi expertise by combining humanitarian and governance know-how with Riyadh’s investment-led model. Closer coordination between European development agencies such as the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships DG INTPA and Saudi institutions like King Salman Center for Humanitarian Relief (KSRelief) or the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) could enable joint projects and capacity alignment. European economic actors should also engage with Saudi development drivers, including Aramco, PIF, and energy company ACWA Power, in sectors of mutual priority such as renewable energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, and climate action, particularly in Africa and Asia.

Amid US-Saudi Uncertainty: Opportunities for European Engagement with Saudi Arabia

While the MbS-Trump meeting underscores the symbolic and strategic importance of US-Saudi relations, significant uncertainties remain. Key aspects of the security partnership and the future of the F-35 deal – particularly given Israeli opposition – remain unresolved. The exact obligations of the Strategic Defense Agreement for Washington’s role in Saudi Arabia’s defense remain uncertain. The arrangement seems less binding than the formal defense treaty that was previously considered under the Biden administration. It is also unclear whether the announced investment commitments will materialize, or whether the AI deal will expedite US export approvals for advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi Arabia, especially given regional competition with the UAE. Indeed, the visit reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s status as a key US partner and its interest in strong bilateral ties. However, Trump’s unpredictability creates opportunities for Europe to engage as a stable partner, offering long-term cooperation in technology transfer, diplomacy, and development, even if Europe lacks the immediate investment scale and visibility of the US. Moreover, the intensifying US-China rivalry places Saudi Arabia in a delicate position as it seeks to maintain ties with both powers. In this context, Europe could offer a less contested option for political and economic cooperation.