Gulf States After The Attack On Qatar And The Trump Gaza Plan.pdf

Following the Israeli strikes on September 9, 2025, targeting senior Hamas officials located in the Qatari capital Doha, the shock runs deep across the Gulf region as long-held security considerations are being fundamentally called into question. For Qatar and other Gulf states, the core concern is not solely the devastating Gaza war or the direct assault on Hamas by Israel. Rather, their focus lies on the broader strategic implications and particularly on their own national security. In this context, Israel is increasingly viewed as a growing security liability and an existential threat. Even after successful negotiations about a ceasefire in Gaza and the implementation of the so-called ‘Trump Plan’, some Gulf states remain reserved and skeptical about a long-term conflict resolution. Here, Europe and the Gulf states could join forces as both interests are at stake if the war in Gaza escalates again.

Regional Implications after the Israeli Strike on Qatar: The Gulf business model on the brink

In recent years, some Gulf states such as Qatar have positioned themselves as reliable bridge-builders and go-betweens in regional conflicts. Since 2012, Qatar not only hosted the Hamas leadership with support of the US and Israel and played a key role in brokering ceasefire negotiations during the Gaza war, but also leveraged its role as a mediator to enhance its own strategic position and shield itself from external threats. Through its “360-degree diplomacy,” Qatar maintained open channels with controversial actors such as Hamas, the Taliban, and Iran while simultaneously cultivating close relations with the United States and Europe.

This multidirectional diplomacy of omni-balancing aimed to preserve Qatar’s leverage and agency. After all, the small Gulf state with a population of only 300,000 Qatari nationals finds itself in a volatile regional and geopolitical position. It has thus repeatedly faced external threats, most recently during the so-called Gulf Crisis (2017-2021), when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt imposed an air, sea, and land blockade on the Emirate. Backed by strong partnerships—most notably with the United States, which maintains a major military base in Al-Udeid and designated Qatar a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2022—Doha sought to mitigate such threats through diplomacy to maintain a strong network of partnerships and preserve agency.

However, Israel’s strike on Doha on September 9, 2025, has deeply unsettled this strategic calculus and severely damaged Qatar’s sense of security and diplomatic confidence. The ‘Doha model’ which is characterized by positioning the country as a neutral platform, credible partner, and regional problem-solver, now faces a serious backlash. The attack marked the first instance since the 1991 Gulf War that a Gulf capital was targeted by a sovereign state, rather than by a militant non-state actor, recalling Iraq’s Scud missile attacks following its invasion of Kuwait.

The broader diplomatic model of other Arab Gulf states is also at stake as they share a unifying priority: leadership survival at any cost. To that end, all Gulf monarchies have embraced a similar strategy which combines economic modernization, network diplomacy, and diversified international partnerships. These elements are seen as essential for navigating an increasingly fragile global order and for maintaining their relevance as hubs of commerce, centers of technological innovation, and credible hosts of high-profile global events such as the FIFA World Cup which took place in Qatar 2022 and will be hosted by Saudi Arabia in 2034.

To pursue those long-term strategies, the Gulf states rely on two key pillars: a relatively stable regional environment and, above all, national security. The former was undermined since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, considered as a watershed moment that has been deeply concerning for Gulf capitals. The latter, has been fundamentally shaken by Israel’s recent strike on Qatari soil. From the perspective of regional actors, if the close US ally Israel is willing to target Qatar without facing any apparent consequences from Washington, then no state in the region can consider itself safe. This is the prevailing interpretation in capitals such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat. Oman, for instance, which maintains open dialogue with the Yemeni Houthis who continue to launch attacks on Israel could, under this logic, also be suffering from Israeli attacks. Even Saudi Arabia, which has taken significant steps in the past two years to normalize relations with its main regional rival and Israel’s foe, the Islamic Republic of Iran, could become the target of Israeli retaliation.

Against this backdrop, all Gulf states have expressed their solidarity with Qatar after the September 9th attacks. Their concern is not merely that Qatar was attacked, but that they themselves could face a similar fate which could put their regional strategies and political legitimacy at serious risk. This shared vulnerability has prompted the Gulf states to emphasize unity. They recognize that only through collective action they can confront what is now increasingly perceived as a even a greater threat than before: Israel. In this regard, 57 Muslim states gathered at the Arab-Islamic Emergency Summit on September 15th to express their solidarity with Qatar and their internal unity. However, joint action against Israel was not decided on the summit as particular Arab actors are taking divergent positions on Israel: Whereas the UAE has signed the ‘Abraham Accords’ and is still interested in a rather pragmatic exchange with Israel, Saudi Arabia has taken a strong pro-Palestinian position but is not interested in further regional escalation. Finally, Qatar has long maintained a dual approach towards Israel: while hosting a US military base and keeping channels open with Israel, it simultaneously upholds a strong pro-Palestinian discourse through Al Jazeera. The network has been a key platform for exposing Israeli violence and centering the Palestinian question at the heart of Arab public consciousness. Some of its journalists have repeatedly been targeted by Israel, both before and after October 7th.

Leverage on Trump: A double-edged sword

Such lack of mutual action reflects the Gulf states’ dilemma: On the one hand, the traditional security guarantor, the United States, can no longer be relied upon which was underscored with dramatic clarity by the Israeli strike on Doha. Hence, the reputation of the United States in the Gulf has once again suffered significant damage. As in September 2019, during US President Donald Trump’s first term, Washington’s failure to respond to Iran’s coordinated missile attacks on two Saudi oil facilities was seen in Riyadh as a serious breach of trust. In the aftermath, Saudi Arabia began gradually recalibrating its foreign policy by moving closer to Iran and deepening its ties with China and Russia in a bid to reduce its dependency on the US. In the aftermath of the Israeli strike on Qatar, all Gulf states are now forced to reassess the value of their close ties and loyalty to Trump especially if those ties fail to shield them from Israeli aggression.

As a result, growing pressure from the Gulf states – in particular from Qatar – was put on the Trump administration which resulted in a public apology by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the attack on Qatar during his visit to Washington and Trump’s executive order of September 29, 2025, which underscores the US support to guarantee Qatar’s security in case of future attacks. Saudi Arabia could aim for a similar defense agreement as Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) plans to travel to the US in November 2025 for the first time since 2018.

However, trust in Trump remains fragile as Gulf states consider him as an unpredictable actor and thus have to prepare for future erratic actions that could further hamper their business model. All Gulf states will continue to diversify their partnerships and their options for deterrence against Israel as indicated by the announcement of the comprehensive Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement soon after the attacks on Qatar happened. The agreement was not signed as a direct reaction on Israel’s strikes as it was in the making for more than one year. However, timing matters: Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan wanted to send a message to both Israel and the US that their security cooperation will be enhanced in light of growing US unreliability. Further recalibrations of security partnerships could include closer alignment with Iran, which is now perceived by many in the Gulf as a lesser and more predictable threat compared to Israel – despite its disruptive regional role. This shifting perception could result in the emergence of new geopolitical fault lines, with Israel increasingly viewed as a primary adversary.

Within this context, discussions about downgrading relations with Israel may gain traction in the UAE and Bahrain that signed the Abraham Accords. So far, both countries have scaled back overt security cooperation in the current political climate, but shy away from withdrawing from the Accords. Still, security cooperation with Israel is considered as an asset when it comes to cyber security, maritime domain awareness, UAV defense, water and energy technologies, logistics, and finance.

For Saudi Arabia, prospects for near-term normalization with Israel remain unrealistic in the absence of substantial US security guarantees and given the risk Israel could renege on its commitments under the Trump Plan. Moreover, the kingdom continues to insist on a credible pathway toward the establishment of a Palestinian state which is an objective that runs counter to the interests of key factions within Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government. Under current conditions, normalization with Israel is therefore viewed in Riyadh less as a strategic opportunity and more as a political and security liability. Such a move would not only undermine Riyadh’s longstanding commitment to the Palestinian cause and Gulf Arab unity, but also expose the kingdom to potential security risks, especially as the Netanyahu government is now widely regarded as a destabilizing and unreliable actor. Nevertheless, Trump still pushes for Arab normalization with Israel. In this context MbS’s visit to Washington seeks to secure both enhanced economic cooperation and tangible security assurances potentially modeled on the type of defense arrangements that Trump maintains with Qatar. Such deals could push Saudi Arabia to consider its critical position on normalization with Israel.

The Gulf states are carefully balancing their option of deterrence and demonization vis-a-vis Israel while at the same time aiming at preserving pragmatic and close ties with Trump. In order to keep their respective business models, they cannot turn away from the US as it remains the most relevant security provider and strong personal ties to Trump and his clique remain key for securing Gulf states’ business interests. In particular Saudi Arabia is facing growing economic obstacles in light of low oil prices and regional fragility which resulted in a recalibration of investments due to limited financial resources. For instance, the giga project NEOM, including the artificial smart city The Line was stopped and the Asian Winter Games in 2029 will most likely not be hosted by the kingdom anymore and might move to South Korea instead.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors continue to operate as business-minded actors by evaluating all partnerships through a lens of interest-based cost-benefit analysis. In that calculus, Israel, particularly after the Doha strike, is now seen as a liability and a growing strategic threat.

The Trump Plan: A Glimpse of Hope – but nothing more

Therefore, the announcement of the so-called Trump Plan, outlining 20 points aimed at ending the Gaza war, has been cautiously welcomed by the Gulf states as a step in the right direction. While not without reservations, regional leaders broadly acknowledged Trump’s renewed diplomatic engagement and particularly his focus on achieving a ceasefire and securing the release of Israeli hostages as a meaningful first step toward long-term de-escalation. In his official statements, Trump also explicitly highlighted the constructive role and engagement of the Gulf states in negotiations. Thus, the agreement reached in Sharm El-Sheikh on October 14, 2025, brokered by Qatar and Egypt, reaffirmed Qatar’s pivotal role in regional mediation efforts and highlighted its ongoing commitment to conflict resolution, despite the damage to its diplomatic standing following the Israeli attacks. For Doha, the agreement represents a notable diplomatic achievement and a demonstration of its continued access to key stakeholders such as Trump.

However, the broader Gulf reaction has been far from euphoric. In general, the Trump plan provides a glimpse of hope, but challenges remain high: First and foremost, the devil lies in the details as important parts of the agreement are not clearly defined. Furthermore, the outbreak of clashes between Israeli forces and Hamas during the ceasefire are concerning signals for the Gulf states that any further disruption of the fragile plan could result in new escalation.

Finally, issues of utmost importance such as the future of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the efficient disarmament of Hamas, the unsolved question regarding the sending of international forces to Gaza and the responsibility for reconstruction remain unresolved. Here, the Gulf states are still taking a wait-and-see approach as they do not want to expose themselves to a risky environment which could further hamper their business interests.

The Gulf states and Europe: A momentum for enhanced collaboration

Despite skepticism, the Trump Plan is currently viewed as the only viable framework to promote de-escalation in Gaza across the Gulf region and Europe. For both, the timely deployment of the nonpartisan Palestinian security force is critical to completely disarm Hamas as well as to the continuous provision of humanitarian aid. Likewise, the presence of a multinational observer and peacekeeping mission, alongside the activation of the Board of Peace, is essential to consolidating the initial gains achieved since the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement. Without visible and coordinated implementation of these security mechanisms, spoilers are likely to exploit the vacuum.

In the event of renewed fighting, especially following the potential release of all Israeli hostages and the handover of the remaining corpses, Gulf and European governments must strengthen coordination to apply political and economic pressure on both Trump and Netanyahu with the objective to ensure adherence to the agreed framework and prevent further escalation. Here, the Gulf states retain a degree of leverage over Trump, primarily through their economic influence. They could signal a willingness to reduce investments in the US or scale back business relations if commitments are not honored. On Israel, the UAE could promote the divestment of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) capital from Israeli companies.

Europe, meanwhile, has a strategic interest in long-term regional stability and could take the lead in crafting a coherent, multilateral plan for Gaza’s reconstruction. Such a plan would ideally be implemented in partnership with Gulf states, combining financial contributions, technical expertise, and capacity-building efforts. Germany has already announced that it will participate in reconstruction efforts and co-host a donor conference with Egypt in November.

However, both Europe and the Gulf face structural limitations. European development assistance and humanitarian aid budgets are under considerable strain due to competing crises. Gulf states are increasingly reluctant to be seen merely as financial donors or “ATMs”. Saudi Arabia is adopting a cautious and conditional diplomatic stance toward post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza. The kingdom is advocating for the establishment of an Arab-international coalition to oversee the reconstruction process but has made clear that it will not commit substantial financial resources unless authority is transferred to the PA or another internationally recognized governance structure. In contrast to Riyadh, the UAE is open to direct cooperation with Israel on Gaza’s reconstruction. However, it conditions such engagement on the establishment of a renewed Palestinian governance framework to ensure transparent management and effective oversight of aid and reconstruction funds.

Those different positions make coordinated and balanced efforts even more critical but also harder to achieve. A jointly supported reconstruction framework embedded within the broader context of the Trump Plan could provide not only humanitarian relief, but also political dividends. For instance, Gulf states could use their ties to the Trump camp to advocate for continued US engagement, especially by highlighting the commercial opportunities a stable Gaza might offer for US-Gulf joint ventures. European actors, for their part, could propose incentives such as future investments in the US market, conditional on Trump’s continued commitment to his peace initiative. Finally, both Europe and the Gulf could publicly support Trump’s bid for the Nobel Peace Prize contingent on full implementation of the plan and tangible pressure on Netanyahu to cooperate. While symbolic, such recognition may offer the political capital Trump seeks, creating a rare alignment of interests that could serve as the foundation for a sustainable peace process.

While such a transactional approach may appear cynical amid the deep humanitarian crisis in Gaza, it could offer a pragmatic path to securing longer-term US involvement.