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The April 2025 visit of Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman (KbS) to Iran marks a pivotal moment in Saudi-Iranian relations, signalling Riyadh’s commitment to de-escalation and diplomatic engagement amid regional tensions. The visit reflects Saudi Arabia’s broader strategic shift toward pragmatic omni-balancing, aimed at fostering regional stability to support its Vision 2030 economic agenda. It also coincided with renewed US-Iran nuclear negotiations, in which Saudi Arabia is seeking a mediating role to gain leverage with the Trump administration, and despite existing mistrust in Iran. Meanwhile, Europe’s E3 (Germany, France, UK) wield limited influence, though mechanisms such as the snapback mechanism offer potential leverage before UN Resolution 2231 expires in October 2025. These dynamics illustrate a new phase in Gulf diplomacy shaped by shifting power centers and emerging strategic pragmatism.

More than a visit

On April 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman (KbS) met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran and delivered a personal letter from his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz. In their informal talks, they discussed topics of mutual interest such as Palestine, Yemen, and bilateral security. A particular focus was on the ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and the Trump administration which is also of utmost relevance for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and Iran are in constant consultations about the ongoing nuclear talks which is indicated by regular bilateral visits such as KbS’ trip to Tehran or Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visit to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in May.

KbS further held discussions with high-ranking Iranian security officials such as Ali Akbar Ahmadian, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and chief of staff of the armed forces Mohammad Bagheri. Khamenei welcomed the visit of KbS and emphasized that “relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are beneficial for both countries,” whereas the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, highlighted the visit as “a turning point” and a “new era” in bilateral relations.

In times of regional escalation and global uncertainty, the landmark visit of KbS to Iran sent a significant symbolic message but also provides an opportunity for enhanced strategic cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. KbS is not just a member of the Saudi government; he is the younger brother of powerful Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) and one of his closest companions. As Defense Minister, he is responsible for Saudi Arabia’s military security and the Saudi involvement in Yemen which highlights his strategic relevance in the kingdom’s political decision-making. In his position as defense minister and former ambassador to the United States, KbS has become one of the highest-ranking Saudi official to visit Iran since Riyadh and Tehran restored relations in 2023.

KbS is also the first high-ranking Saudi official to meet with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in nearly two decades, marking a significant step in the renewal of bilateral diplomatic engagement. The last Saudi defense minister who met with the Supreme Leader was Sultan bin Abdulaziz in 1999 and the last Saudi official who met Khamenei was Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud in 2006.

Political omni-balancing and economic development

KbS’s trip to Tehran highlights Saudi Arabia’s de-risking and omni-balancing strategy that aimed at promoting de-escalation and reconciliation with its regional rival Iran amid escalating tensions between the Islamic Republic and Israel and the kingdom’s ongoing push to diversify its economy. As the kingdom undergoes a critical phase of socio-economic transformation, it has prioritized regional stability as essential to advancing its ‘Vision 2030’ agenda. In the context of global volatility ranging from the Ukraine war and US-China tensions to ongoing conflicts in Palestine and Syria, Riyadh has adopted a pragmatic approach toward Iran as part of a broader strategy to hedge in a multipolar world.

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom is working to attract foreign investment, reduce dependence on oil, and address youth unemployment, which is high standing at 13.7% in 2023. Ensuring a stable regional environment is thus viewed as a prerequisite for economic diversification, private sector growth, and social cohesion. In short, Saudi Arabia has recognized that the success of ‘Vision 2030’ depends on managing tensions with Iran through diplomacy and dialogue, rather than through confrontation.

Strategic Security Cooperation

The trip to Tehran also fits into Saudi Arabia’s efforts to present itself as a platform for conflict mediation and dialogue facilitation as indicated by hosting US, Russian, and Ukrainian officials to mitigate tensions in the Ukraine war or its efforts to find a diplomatic solution for the devastating Gaza war. In doing so, the kingdom positions itself as an honest broker by promoting a “Not alone” approach in a polarized multi-polar world order. Against this backdrop, the kingdom aims to shift its fragile ties with the Islamic Republic from tactical risk management to strategic cooperation.

In light of ongoing Israeli military action against Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fall of Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Saudi Arabia perceives Iran’s strategic position in the Near and Middle East as relatively weak. Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia views the current regional power shift as a potential game-changer in its volatile relationship with Iran. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been marked by cycles of antipathy, antagonism, and apathy. Alongside this ongoing rivalry, periods of bilateral cooperation and exchange existed highlighting the complex and heterogeneous nature of their relations in recent decades.

For years, the Iranian-Saudi rivalry was driven by competing geostrategic, political, and economic ambitions, with both nations vying for regional influence and global energy market leadership. Since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran has expanded its presence through alliances with actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, Assad in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. This growing network of proxies has heightened Saudi fears of encirclement, fuelling what some describe as “Iranoia.” Iran’s missile program and the IRGC’s central role in regional strategy, along with Houthi attacks on Saudi territory, have further escalated tensions and security concerns in Riyadh.

However, since 2019, the phase of tensions shifted towards de-escalation. On September 14, 2019, drones and missiles attacked the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities which resulted in temporary 50% reduction of the Saudi oil production. Saudi Arabia and the US accused Iran of launching the attack. For the kingdom, the strike marked a turning point in its relations with Iran, as it exposed two key vulnerabilities: First, the kingdom’s economic dependence on oil infrastructure and, second, the limits of US military support, as demonstrated by then-President Trump’s decision not to authorize retaliatory strikes against Iran.

This assessment prompted a shift toward diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic. Beginning in 2020, Saudi Arabia entered direct talks with Iran, facilitated by Iraq and Oman. These efforts culminated in the signing of the China-brokered ‘Beijing Agreement’ in March 2023, signalling a new phase of cautious rapprochement. Since then, Iran re-opened its embassy in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic operations  in 2023. In September 2023, the new Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, arrived in Riyadh on the same day the kingdom’s new envoy to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, began his diplomatic duties in Tehran. In November 2023, Saudi Arabia’s leadership invited Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi to participate in the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in light of the escalating war between Israel and the Hamas.

Facilitating the Nuclear Talks between US and Iran

Finally, KbS visit came at a relevant time as it took place a few days prior to the visit of US President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar in mid-May. In preparation of Trump’s planned trip, the Saudi leadership also aimed to improve its own strategic position towards the US administration by sending KbS to Tehran. Here, communication channels with the Iranian government could offer Saudi Arabia more leverage on Trump amid ongoing talks between Washington and Tehran on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Since April 2025, US and Iranian delegations led by Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held four rounds of indirect discussions on the nuclear file facilitated by Oman in Muscat and hosted by the Omani embassy in Rome. These talks were described as constructive and signalled renewed interest in de-escalation and nuclear diplomacy. However, the challenges remain high: Trump warned for military strikes against Iran if no agreement can be found. As for the moment, however, military action does not seem to be the first option for Trump.

It was reported that Trump refused to approve a plan presented by the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in May. Netanyahu demands the “Libya-model” dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program which is non-acceptable for Tehran. In contrast, Iran oftentimes expressed that it is has rejected calls to dismantle his nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief and wants to preserve its right to enrich uranium domestically whereas US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran should import enriched uranium for its nuclear program.

Saudi Arabia welcomes the US engagement and the resumption of talks with Iran as they will “lead to supporting joint action to enhance security, stability, and peace in the region and the world.”  In this context, Saudi Arabia views the US-Iranian talks as the most effective means to prevent a wider regional conflict. While leaderships in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals still have deep reservations about specific elements of any new agreement, they generally assess that a negotiated compromise between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue is essential to achieving lasting stability in the Middle East.

While Riyadh certainly opposes any initiatives that would enable Iran to develop nuclear weapons, it also acknowledges that military conflict poses a serious threat to regional security and its reputation as an attractive investment location. In this regard, the ongoing talks between the Trump administration and Iran provides Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states an opportunity to engage in nuclear diplomacy. For instance, it was reported that Saudi Arabia intends to mediate between Iran and the US in addition to the ongoing facilitation by Oman. It was further speculated that KbS during his Tehran trip offered Khamenei the opportunity for a meeting of Iranian officials with US counterparts. Despite the fact that such an exchange did not take place yet, Saudi Arabia is interested to playing a productive and constructive role in US-Iranian talks.

Perspectives of a uranium enrichment consortium framework

In this regard, Saudi Arabia as well as the UAE could facilitate Iran’s civilian nuclear program by providing enriched uranium. Such an idea was presented by Iranian officials as a confidence-building measure to overcome US objections to its continued enrichment program. Within such a regional uranium enrichment consortium framework, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would serve as shareholders and financial contributors by securing access to Iranian nuclear technology. The participation of these Gulf states could provide additional assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful and civilian purposes.

It was also said that this proposal does not include joint oversight of Iran’s existing enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz, which are located deep underground. Instead, the plan envisions the construction of at least one new facility subject to shared supervision closer to UAE and Saudi Arabia. Such a consortium could pave the way for foreign investment into Iran’s nuclear industry.

This idea was announced by Araghchi who emphasized the country’s intent to attract foreign investment for the development of 19 additional nuclear power plants, signaling Tehran’s continued focus on expanding its civilian nuclear infrastructure. By presenting Iran’s nuclear sector as a promising avenue for foreign investment, Araghchi appealed not only to the Trump administration’s commercial interests but also implicitly addressed regional actors including Saudi Arabia. As the kingdom pursues the development of its own civilian nuclear program in partnership with the US, the prospect of future cooperation with Iran – though currently unlikely – could, under different geopolitical conditions, present strategic and economic value and leverage.

As Saudi Arabia is interested in close and trustworthy relations with Trump but also fears his transactional unpredictability, Riyadh aims to gain more leverage on the US administration through its exchange with Iran. In this regard, the kingdom is turning towards more non- or multi-alignment in its foreign policymaking and aims to gain more strategic autonomy. This shift in strategy is driven by a growing mistrust in the US: Back in 2015, Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the US administration under President Barack Obama grew. His engagement to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) with Iran on its nuclear program further deepened the Saudi mistrust in the US as the kingdom was not involved in the negotiations.

As such, the JCPoA was considered by Saudi Arabia as a carte blanche for Iran to intensify its support for regional proxies undermining the kingdom’s security interests. Since then, mistrust in the credibility of the US as a reliable security partner has grown and was even intensified since the 2019 attacks and the Biden administration.  Today, a skeptical optimism towards Trump shapes the public and political discourse across wide parts of the Gulf region. Against this backdrop, Riyadh could aim to enter an agreement with the US on civilian nuclear technology. Saudi Arabia has long advocated for establishing a uranium enrichment facility on its territory as a central element of nuclear cooperation with the United States.

This facility would produce low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear power reactors. In relation to Iran, US-Saudi nuclear collaboration could serve a dual purpose for the Kingdom. First, it would enable Saudi Arabia to advance its civilian nuclear program with US support. Second, it could facilitate closer cooperation with Iran by leveraging Saudi nuclear technology. This approach could unlock significant economic opportunities should sanctions on Iran be eased, while also providing a mechanism to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities which aligns with US strategic interests. In exchange, the US could offer substantial financial assistance to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear development efforts.

However, Saudi Arabia maintains a cautious stance toward these plans, as deep-seated mistrust of Iran’s commitment to a purely civilian nuclear program continues to influence decision-making within the kingdom. Back in 2018, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that the kingdom would pursue the development of nuclear weapons if Iran were to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. At present, perspectives for nuclear cooperation are further grim due to international sanctions, Iran’s exclusion from the SWIFT financial system, and its blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Nevertheless, in the context of a renewed nuclear agreement, the possibility of Saudi-Iranian nuclear collaboration can no longer be entirely dismissed. For Iran, such a partnership would enhance regional integration, attract foreign investment, and facilitate technology transfer. For Saudi Arabia, it could offer a powerful instrument of monitoring and influencing Iran’s nuclear activities to prevent weaponization. Hence, a shift from isolation to integration may, in time, shape Riyadh’s approach to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

Currently, Riyadh finds itself in a strategically smart position: It can aim to persuade Trump to adopt a more patient stance toward Tehran. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia could promote a similar conciliatory approach towards Iran by encouraging the Islamic Republic to refrain from escalating conflicts in regions such as Iraq, Yemen, and the Levant.

Europe’s leverage remains limited but not minimal

In light of such developments, Europe finds itself in a bystander role with limited influence over the broader course of negotiations. Notably, the European Union (EU) does not occupy a significant role in the ongoing nuclear negotiations. Neither the European Commission nor the European Parliament possesses the necessary leverage or diplomatic agency to influence the process meaningfully. At this stage, neither of the principal parties to the talks – the United States and Iran – regards the EU as an essential negotiating partner. From the European side, the E3 which includes Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have engaged in four rounds of discussions with Iran between November 2024 and March 2025 to prevent further military escalation in the region. However, the impact of these talks remains limited. Nevertheless, the E3 can still play a constructive role through a two-pronged approach:

First, the E3 should expand and support both Track 1 and Track 2 diplomatic initiatives involving key regional stakeholders including the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf countries to address divergent perceptions of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and their implications for regional stability. Over the years, various initiatives aimed at fostering enhanced exchange between Saudi Arabia and Iran by often involving European partners. Saudi state and non-state actors continue to express interest in participating in such formats, reflecting the kingdom’s broader objective of deepening engagement with European stakeholders. These initiatives can function as platforms for informal dialogue, particularly valuable in periods of heightened mutual mistrust.

In this context, European non-governmental experts could play a constructive role by participating in discussions related to the nuclear program, even in the absence of formal governmental representation. Such engagement may enable the transmission of indirect messages to both US and Iranian stakeholders, aligning with shared Saudi and European interests.

Second, the snapback mechanism, which allows for the reinstatement of UN sanctions in response to Iranian non-compliance remains a powerful tool for the E3. As the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, only the E3 retain the legal authority to initiate this mechanism. This means a significant point of leverage in the context of ongoing negotiations.

However, the window for activation is closing rapidly, as Resolution 2231’s expiration in October 2025 would eliminate this option and severely diminish the international community’s ability to enforce compliance. Furthermore, Iranian officials have stated that any activation of the snapback mechanism would be considered as a provocation and lead to a “harsh and decisive response”. Therefore, time and communication are critical factors for the E3: The legal foundation of the 2015 JCPoA will expire on October 18, 2025, with the termination of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This development will formally release Iran from the original restrictions and verification mechanisms outlined in the JCPoA.

Alarmingly, experts estimate that Tehran could produce sufficient material for five to six nuclear weapons within just two weeks which raises concerns in the US, Europe, and regional players such as Saudi Arabia. Compounding the problem, the Islamic Republic has reportedly reduced its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Recommendations to European policy makers:

• Against this backdrop, the E3 should prioritize structured coordination with the Trump administration, despite current US reluctance. Presently, talks remain fragmented and lack a unified Western strategy.
• In addition, the E3 should engage more with Saudi Arabia to establish a coordinated line of communication towards Iran and nuclear diplomacy. Together with Saudi Arabia, Europe could support nuclear talks publicly and oppose military escalation.
• Although the European Union does not play a direct role in the current nuclear negotiations, it remains essential for European stakeholders such as the E3 and the EU institutions to establish a unified position on the Iran nuclear file. Given that Europe, the United States, and Saudi Arabia share common concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions, enhanced coordination of their respective strategies is critical to preventing regional escalation and supporting a sustainable agreement that addresses the diverse security interests involved.
• In this context, deeper coordination with the Trump administration should be prioritized. This entails intensifying European engagement both bilaterally, through the E3, and multilaterally, through EU mechanisms. While Europe’s leverage remains limited and relations with Trump are strain, it retains the capacity to pursue a balanced approach by applying pressure on Iran while avoiding actions that might trigger further provocation.
• The snapback mechanism constitutes a significant diplomatic tool in this regard. It offers a means to increase pressure on Iran and incentivize constructive concessions, potentially averting a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. However, invoking the snapback mechanism carries considerable risk. If miscalculated, it could prompt Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), representing a worst-case scenario for both Europe and Saudi Arabia, and potentially opening the path to a direct US-Iran confrontation.