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Tunisia’s upcoming presidential elections have stirred significant controversy. Of the 17 initial candidates, only three have been approved by the contentious electoral commission (ISIE). Aside from President Saied himself and Zouhair Maghzaoui, a staunch supporter of the Said’s 2021 coup, the third candidate, Ayachi Zammel, is embroiled in multiple criminal charges, the most recent being a 12-year sentence for ‘falsifying sponsorships.

The outcome remains uncertain if Zammel wins, as ISIE holds full control over the electoral process. Concurrently, an increasing number of politicians, public figures and civil society leaders have faced severe prison sentences under dubious accusations, including journalist Sonia Dahmani, anti-racism activist Saadia Mosbah, and opposition members from the 2011-2021 democratic transition era. For most, these elections appear to solidify Tunisia's authoritarian drift since President Saied's power grab three years ago.

Why So Few Presidential Candidates?

The country’s upcoming presidential elections on October 6, 2024, have been marked by heightened political tension, especially for the candidates who initially intended to run. To date, at least eight potential candidates have been prosecuted, convicted, or imprisoned by Tunisian authorities. The ISIE, which has been closely involved in suppressing dissent, stands out for its role, with its members being directly appointed by the president since 2022. The launch of the presidential election process seems to have cemented its subservient role to the ruling regime.

On August 5, 2024, Abir Moussi, leader of the Free Destourian Party (PDL), was sentenced to two years in prison under the controversial Decree-Law 54, following a complaint from the ISIE for questioning the legitimacy of the legislative elections. Earlier, in February, the commission pushed for the sentencing of Jawher Ben Mbarek, a political opponent already imprisoned on charges of plotting against state security. He received an additional six-month sentence for describing the 2022 elections as a ‘ridiculous coup d'état’.

Further escalating matters, five presidential hopefuls were sentenced to eight months in prison on the grounds that they attempted to sway voters with donations, a decision recently confirmed on September 8 by the Tunis Court of Appeal. Among them were former Ennahdha figure Abdellatif El Mekki and media personality Nizar Chaari, both of whom also faced lifelong ineligibility.

Many other candidates have abandoned their campaigns due to administrative hurdles. One significant challenge is obtaining bulletin n°3 (B3), the criminal record extract required for candidacy. This stipulation, contested by the opposition, was previously dismissed by the administrative court for the 2014 election. However, in 2024, the requirement has resurfaced as a major obstacle, as it is delivered by the Ministry of the Interior.

Additionally, imprisoned candidates, such as those from opposition parties like the aforementioned Abir Moussi, Issam Chebbi from Al-Jomhouri, or Ghazi Chaouachi from the Democratic Current, faced yet another barrier. Despite submitting powers of attorney signed by their relatives, ISIE required a separate, election-specific authorisation for submitting candidacy documents, making it impossible for them to register.

Media and Journalists Under Siege

Since the regime change, being a journalist critical of the government has become increasingly perilous – hardly news to anyone familiar with the political climate. Numerous journalists are currently serving long prison sentences, mostly for what amounts to ‘thought crimes’. This atmosphere of repression and growing self-censorship is further fuelled by the ISIE’s heavy-handed stance on media coverage of elections. The electoral authority has, for instance, targeted journalists and media outlets that have criticised its management of the election process.

Since July 2024, four private radio stations – Express FM, Mosaïque FM, Jawhara FM and Diwan FM – have received written warnings from the ISIE for airing critical commentary. Mosaïque FM, for instance, was warned twice, on July 16 and 31, for comments made by journalists Kaouther Zantour and Assya Atrous on episodes of the most-listened-to political radio program ‘Midi Show’, which the ISIE deemed to have ‘intended to harm and mock the authority and the electoral process’. Shortly thereafter, on September 6, Express FM was similarly reprimanded over lawyer Imed Ben Halima’s remarks questioning the independence of the electoral commission during its ‘Grand Express’ program.

In late August this year, the commission even revoked the accreditation of Khaoula Boukrim, founding journalist of Tumedia, accusing her of failing to ensure ‘objective, balanced, and neutral media coverage of the electoral process’. It cited decision no. 2014-9 from June 9, 2014, which governs the admission of local and foreign observers to elections, setting a worrying precedent.

This increased intervention by the ISIE has been met with strong opposition, especially after the publication of decision no. 545 on July 17, 2024, which imposed even stricter rules on media during election and referendum campaigns. The Tunisian Journalists’ Union has condemned the commission’s actions, and several demonstrations have been held outside the commission’s headquarters.

A Last-Minute Modification Of The Electoral Law

On September 27 – just ten days before the election – Tunisia’s parliament voted overwhelmingly (116 votes) to modify the electoral law, transferring electoral dispute resolution from the Administrative Tribunal to the judiciary court. This move followed a growing clash between ISIE and the Tribunal, which had recently ruled to reinstate three key presidential candidates – Abdellatif Mekki, Mondher Zenaidi (a former Ben Ali minister), and Imed Daïmi (former chief of staff under Moncef Marzouki) – after they contested the electoral commission’s rejection of their candidacies. These candidates were viewed as some of the most serious contenders against President Saied.

The Administrative Tribunal called on the electoral commission to enforce its ruling, but ISIE ignored the decision, despite the court's rulings being legally binding. In response, over a third of the parliamentarians – aligned with the president – urgently presented a bill to strip the Administrative Tribunal of its authority over electoral disputes and hand it over to the Court of Appeal. Critics have denounced the move as unconstitutional. It is worth noting that the new parliament was elected in 2022 with only 11% voter turnout, raising concerns about the legitimacy of such drastic legal changes.

As the regime solidifies its authoritarian grip, opposition forces are growing bolder and public dissent is escalating. Protests have become more frequent and are drawing larger crowds. In early September, a coalition of prominent organisations and associations, including the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), and the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), alongside eight left-leaning political parties, announced the formation of the Tunisian Network for Rights and Freedoms. This coalition has been instrumental in mobilising protests against the regime’s increasingly anti-democratic policies.

Recently, Tunisians gathered in front of the parliament in the Bardo neighbourhood, denouncing the sudden and unconstitutional amendment to the electoral law. This protest evoked memories of the mass demonstrations in 2013, which forced the then-ruling Ennahdha party to step down. The recent changes to the electoral law, pushed through just days before the election, have sparked widespread outrage, with critics accusing the regime of manipulating the legal framework to consolidate power further.

In another notable act of defiance, over a hundred law professors, including several deans, issued a statement on September 5 condemning the ISIE’s refusal to comply with binding administrative court rulings. Defiance has fuelled calls for boycotting the upcoming elections, which many view as a mere façade of democracy. As a result, low voter turnout is expected, with many Tunisians disillusioned by what they see as a sham electoral process designed to cement the current regime’s dominance.

The growing discontent, marked by increasingly larger protests and a return of civil society organisational influence, might signal a change in the overwhelming political apathy that has met the dismantling of democratic norms in the last three years, although President Saied retains his popularity.