In August 2013, Ibrahim Jadhran[1], a member of the government of Cyrenaica, took advantage of the declaration of autonomy of this historic Libyan region, created in March 2012, to grant himself the monopoly of control over the oil sites of Ras Lanouf, Brega, and Suitena, which lie at the heart of the Libyan "oil crescent".
The oil crescent is composed of five oil terminals on the border of Tripolitania to the west, and Cyrenaica to the east. This assault not only laid bare the direct opposition between two historic Libyan regions, between the Tripoli in the west and Tobruk in the east, but also highlights the place of deus ex machina taken by the oil rent at the heart of the second Libyan civil war.
The binary opposition between the two main Libyan regions, marked by heterogeneous dynamics, is clearly structured around the hold on oil revenues. In the words of Jean-Yves Moisseron[2], "the one who holds the power, holds the rent," a reference to the total revenues derived from the exploitation of hydrocarbons in Libya. The resumption of production at oil terminals by General Khalifa Haftar on March 14, 2017[3], and its consequential insertion in the international diplomatic game, testifies to the veracity of the assertion. Moreover, the increasing political space occupied by former general-self-proclaimed marshal illustrates the continued importance of the Gaddafi legacy in the reconstruction of post-revolutionary Libya.
Hydrocarbons at the Core of a Binary Opposition
The perpetuation of the rivalry between East and West- Cyrenaica and Tripolitania- undermines the sustainable recovery of the oil industry. Libyan oil reserves are valued at 48 billion dollars, placing Libya first in Africa, 9th in the world, and 5th in the world in gas reserves, with nearly 1600 billion cubic meters of reserve[4]. Ultra-dependence on oil characterized the Libyan economy during the governance of the Libyan Raïs and the reign of Gaddafi, and is now perpetuated in this post-revolutionary phase.
Indeed, the redistribution of the financial windfall derived from the oil revenue exploitation to reinforce political allegiances remains a fundamental principle of the Libyan political game. Known as the Green Book pact during Gaddafi's reign, the centralized benefits of oil revenues allowed Prime Minister Faiez el Sarraj to maintain support from various clans and tribes, historical components of Libyan society. Furthermore, General Haftar’s moves on the infrastructure of the Oil Crescent, and now on the city of Benghazi since July 6, force the international community to rethink the composition of the Libyan political game.
Thus, while the oil industry contributes to fuel the Libyan conflict, its dynamism is the main prerequisite for improving the living conditions of the Libyan people. Accordingly, the forecasts of the National Oil Company’s president, Mustafa Sanalla, leave uncertainty about the future of Libya. He believes that Libya can hope to regain a production level equivalent to that of 2010 with 1.5 million barrels per day.[5] While an increase in exports to Western powers of prized Libyan oil makes it possible to improve the living conditions of Libyan citizens, it accentuates the prism of a binary political opposition between the head of the National Unity Government, Prime Minister Sarraj, and the chief of the Libyan National Army (ANL), General Haftar.
Moreover, the establishment of the NOC in Tripoli contributes to reinforce the resentment of the Cyrenaica region against Sarraj’s power. The autonomy of Cyrenaica, embodied by the installation of the House of Representatives in Tobruk, is explained by tribal and clan oppositions, as well as a classical ideological partition between Islamist and liberal tendencies. Furthermore, Cyrenaica has long held a clear advantage in the acquisition of resources. Indeed, Cyrenaica has two-thirds of hydrocarbon resources and only one-third of the Libya’s population, with 1.6 million inhabitants.
The end of a united Libya would undoubtedly allow the region to benefit from its large oil rent. It is through this framework that the debate on the historic cohesion of the Libyan state appears as an opportunity for local actors to exploit the Gulf’s oil wealth.
Oil as a Blurring Opportunity
In this regard, UN Resolution 2146 adopted on 19 March 2014[6] further highlights the influence of the the oil crisis issue and its consequences on national unity. The resolution adopted by the UN Security Council specifically prohibits ‘illegal export of crude oil from Libya’, which is defined as any operation beyond the control of the Government of National Accord’s NOC based in Tripoli. Nevertheless, the centralization of the management of the oil rent imposed by the UN is opposed to the federalist logics that underlie the internal conflicts in Libya.
For example, on June 14th 2017, the government of Abdallah Al Thani, opposed to the Sarraj government, ordered a shutdown of Glencore, which produces about 190,000 barrels per day and has an exclusive contract to export the oil from the Hariga terminal[7]. This decision again highlights the rivalry between East and West. According to Reuters, Libya’s NOC ‘warned authorities based in the east of the country not to use a rift between several Arab states and Qatar as a pretext for exporting oil illegally’[8]. The Hariga terminal is a strategic point, and the BIC believes that this move was risky for Libyan economy because it reinforced competition between governments. However, the BIC also contends that this move shows how finding common ground on oil exports can help reanimate the economy.
This would further stabilize the country and produce a new structural model for Libya that would maximize the full potential of the country and its diversity[9].
The threat posed by the oil sector to Libya’s political future can only be understood with regard to the fragmentation of the security sector inherited from the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, Muammar Gaddafi, anxious to consolidate his power, registered the atomization of the armed forces into multiple bodies, according to the principles of “counterbalancing”. The division of the army into different entities theoretically allowed him to guarantee the resilience of the central power. The fall of Gaddafi did not allow the unification of the armed forces due to the multiplicity of interests within the different clans, tribes, and ethnic groups that make up the Libyan political landscape.
The various militias in Libya, after the revolution, represent nearly 250,000 men, while the official army has only 35,000 soldiers. Competition around oil revenues, a continuous phenomenon since Muammar Gaddafi's rise to power, has exacerbated the processes of militia expansion and tribal competitions that have become core components of the Libyan political process. The “statelessness” concept described by John Davis is deeply rooted in post-revolution Libya, and this phenomenon has further deteriorated in the absence of Gadhafi’s centralized political hold within the Jamahiriya.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the disappearance of a centre of gravity for security and political organs has led to the multiplication of conflict and the use of urban solidarity as a point of attachment for Libyan citizens. Tribal and clan dynamics are integrated in nearly every segment of Libyan society, and combined with the historic disputes over oil rent. These factors have led to the impossibility of a unified, modern Libyan state.
Libya's dependence on oil revenues has prevented any differentiated process of regional economic reconstruction and has fuelled the violent competition. This comparative advantage at the disposal of Cyrenaica strengthened the federalist and separatist movements from the East, thus contributing to the fragmentation of Libya.
Thus, Libyan oil has a dual status: a factor of development for the Libyan economy and a factor of political rivalry, which contributes to the continued fragmentation of the security apparatus. In this regard, the reestablishment of Libya’s political unity is a prerequisite to allow the country’s economy to benefit from its oil revenues.
Therefore, the Brussels International Center for Research and Human Rights recommends that:
-The political center of gravity of Libya must be re-established in Tripoli in order to shift incentives towards cooperation, and shift the spectre of a military power held by General Khalifa Haftar. This measure is conditional on the abandonment of militias, notably those of Misrata, in order to guarantee the Libyan state's permanence and eventual integration into the official army.
-The restoration of Libyan unity requires a major reform of the oil institutions marked by Gaddafi's legacy. The democratization of the management of the oil rent would put an end to the prevalence of discriminatory client selection in Libya.
-The establishment of the NOC in Tripoli does not correspond to the economic reality of Libya. It should be installed in the oil crescent or in Tobruk in order to alleviate the feelings of alienation and lack of consideration felt by the inhabitants of Cyrenaica.
- The reconstruction of Libya must involve the revival of the oil sector and its exports, especially through foreign companies based in Libya. The application of OPEC production quotas to Libya would undermine efforts to achieve political stability.