Well before the sparks of the Arab uprisings, borderland communities in Libya already held suspicions and discontent toward the central authority. Some regions benefited both economically and politically from the connections with the ruling elite, whereas others suffered from uneven economic development.
31 July 2017
Political and Historical background
To understand the current political turmoil and the proliferated intra-communal disputes in Libya, a brief, but nonetheless essential, fragment of the first ripples of upheaval in the country must be highlighted.
In fact, well before the sparks of the Arab uprisings, borderland communities in Libya already held suspicions and discontent toward the central authority. Some regions benefited both economically and politically from the connections with the ruling elite, whereas others suffered from uneven economic development. Meanwhile, the security apparatus manipulated the intra-communal conflicts between regions, including the control of smuggling routes and trafficking cartels[1]. Arising from historical grievances therefore, the uprisings in Libya caused a political renewal in the MENA region that still has consequences nowadays. The revolution in Libya started peacefully before turning into a civil war that caused dozens of thousands of victims, further redefining the way in which people related to the state and its representatives.
The post-Qaddafi power vacuum stem from a single reality: revolutionary brigades, clans, members from the military as well as civilians have stepped as security actors. In truth, because the country lacks fully functioning state with an effective security apparatus, parallel forces emerged, which exacerbated local disputes[2]. More specifically, post-revolution leaders were faced with the complex task of unraveling local rivalries created during Qaddafi’s rule. In addition to this, underlying socio-economic disparities forced clans in some regions of the country to exploit the security vacuum and impose control over alternative and illegal trading opportunities.
The political reality is another underlying factor that further twists the current situation in Libya. Today, the country is mainly split into two entities led by two key figures: Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of a military coalition (LNA) that currently controls the East part of Libya and was also a former member of Qaddafi’s government, and Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya Al Sarraj, representing the internationally recognized government.
Most recently, the dynamics between these two forces have changed as the LNA, under Haftar’s leadership, gained control of strategic cities like Sawkna, Waddan and Hun. In addition to these gains, Haftar’s forces have recently defeated the Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB) that includes members of Ansar Al-Sharia, a Salafist Islamist militia group that advocated the implementation of strict Sharia law across Libya. It is worth noting that the LNA is backed by countries such as Egypt and receives the necessary equipment and resources to use against officially designated terrorist groups, as the Misratan brigades and BDB. Other clashes between militias continue to divide the country and tensions were brewing among those there and elsewhere. The risk of open confrontation is real on multiple fronts[3].
Another potential reconfiguration of Libya’s scene is the release of another actor. An amnesty law passed last year by Tobruk’s government and its eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) has freed Seif Al-Islam, son of Qaddafi who has been held in captivity for the last five years[4]. While the HoR in Tobruk considers Al-Islam a free man, the Tripoli’s international recognized government still considers him a war criminal[5]. The question that rises from this problematic is which legal decision bears upon Al-Islam?
The Consequences of the Conflict in Libya
Today, the conflict in Libya has turned the MENA and Sahel region into a vast high-risk trafficking area. We are now facing growing and common security challenges - such as trans-border terrorism, smuggling of illicit goods (including drugs and weapons), trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, and irregular migration.
According to the French Intelligence Service, Libya is host to nearly one million refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers of different nationalities whose humanitarian conditions are increasingly precarious[6]. Due to the political instability and armed conflict, Benghazi, Derna, Sabha, Tripoli, Ubari and Zintan are among the major cities affected by displacement[7]. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also identified and located 348,372 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Libya[8].
While the security situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous, Libya is still an important transit for migrants who arrive searching for employment or trying to reach Europe. According to the IOM, 278,327 migrants have arrived in Europe by sea and the majority of those departed from Libya[9].
The Failures of 2015 Libyan Political Agreement
Most recently, French president Macron invited both Haftar and Sarraj to France to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, potentially leading to the approval of a cease-fire between factions and a new road-map for Libya. Efforts made by Paris is a new attempt to restore the failures of the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Skhirat, Morocco.
The agreement signed in Morocco has reconfigured more than contributed to a peaceful solution. As pointed out by the International Crisis Group, before the agreement, the main conflict was between two rival forces. Today, however, it is between those who support the accord and its opponents[10].
Per the terms of The Agreement
“A nine-member Presidential Council and a seventeen –member interim Government of National Accord (GNA) was formed with the notion of holding new elections within two years. The HoR was to continue to exist as a legislature and an advisory body to be called the State Council. The State Council was thus formed with members nominated by the New General National Congress. The GNA and Agreement is backed by the United Nations[11].”
The aim to create a unified government failed mainly due to the fact that the actors involved did not recognized each other as relevant stakeholders. In addition to that, vital security sector actors were missing at the negotiation table[12]. Put differently, the 2015 Accord attempted to overcome the clashes between the HoR and its government (Tobruk, Al Baida) and the General National Congress (Tripoli), with the creation of a Presidency Council, without an institutional set-up and technical legalities.
In this way, Skhirat’s underlying goals, which was to avoid further military confrontation and preventing financial collapse, appear more and more distant, as there is no political ripeness for a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, the latest attempts of Macron to reenergize the peace process in Libya present yet another opportunity to overcome the failures of Skhirat’s Peace Accord. But there are a number of elements that needs to be seriously taken into consideration to avoid past mistakes.
No Conflict Solution without an Inclusive Political Dialogue
As pointed out, little or no progress will be made without comprehensively involving all parties implicated in the conflict on the negotiating table, including representatives from the Touaregs and Tebus. Therefore, the Brussels International Center for Research and Human Rights recommends and urges that:
Recommendations:
- All the parties should be brought together and strategies for engagement should be developed in a long-term framework. Opening lines of communication among the main actors can be essential to assess whether other forms of engagement are feasible. In this way, a holistic and non-exclusive approach in terms of actors involved in negotiations is necessary.
- Safeguard Libyan refugees’ and IDPs rights to voluntary return.
- Launch a stabilization process of the economy through a gas and oil special Committee. The BIC believes that a substantial step to bring peace and structural stability is by finding a common denominator and point of interest among the parties involved. This common point is the reenergization of Libya’s economic development by expanding and developing legal channels of oil exploitation.
That being said, the BIC is currently developing a road-map that aims to provide a common platform and bring all the parties from the conflict in Libya and the international community together, while making recommendations for an effective peace process to take place.