On Tuesday 29th May in Paris, key political figures in Libya met with French President Emmanuel Macron, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salame, as well as many other international actors to discuss steps towards political stabilization. The main players represented were Fayez Sarraj, Prime Minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), General Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) that controls much of Libya’s East, Khalid al-Meshri, head of the Supreme State Council, a consultive body for the GNA, and Aquila Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives, allied with Haftar and the Eastern Government based in Tobruk.
At the conference, the players agreed in principle upon a document to work constructively with the UN to work towards credible and peaceful elections by the 10th December 2018, a decision that was hailed as a historic step by the French President[1]. However, there are multiple reasons to be hesitant about the outcomes of this conference, and the feasibility of the December 10th date.
Ongoing Conflict and Insecurity
Even as the summit talks proceeded, fighting within Libya continued unabated. The Western GNA has repeatedly called upon the ending of the siege of Dernah in the East by Haftar’s forces. This city has seen much fighting over the past few years where certain Islamists and other anti-Haftar forces, such as the Shura Council, have fought against the LNA. The conflict has resulted in a significant humanitarian crisis that has been raised in the UN[2], and widely reported by certain media outlets[3].
In the South, in the city of Sabha, there have been differing reports[4] of fighting between local groups such as the Awaid Sulaiman and Tubu, and other militias, of which some have reportedly pledged loyalty to the different players of East and West. Interestingly, the insecurity in Sabha has not attracted as much attention due to lower reported casualties. However, perhaps this scene of violence is important for other reasons as it draws the disagreement between Libya’s main players into a deadly confrontation. The importance of Sabha in this regard cannot be overstated, not only as a gateway into Libya’s restless South and to the entry-point for the human trafficking routes from other parts of Africa, but also that there are real risks of greater violence and escalation between the rival factions: Sabha today, Tripoli tomorrow?
In addition to these larger scale operations, there are significant risks posed by armed Islamists, such as the remnants of Daesh, as well as other violent actors. For instance, the oil ports in Ras Lanuf and Es Sider, under control by Haftar, were recently attacked by armed brigades[5]. The United Sates has reportedly killed Daesh militants near the town of Bani Walid by airstrike[6]. And Mitiga international airport within Tripoli has recently experienced such attacks[7]. It is imperative that any political agreement is first and foremost mindful of the wellbeing of ordinary Libyan citizens, and prioritizes their safety and security. A rush to an unsuccessful election process may cause an already volatile situation to erupt.
(European Council on Foreign Relations)
True Dialogue or Propaganda?
It is well known that Sarraj and Haftar have represented rival positions within Libya for some time. The desire of the international community has always been to accommodate these two actors, for instance in May 2017 such a meeting between the two leaders took place in Abu Dhabi[8], whilst France again held a meeting between the two later that year in July[9]. However, with the inclusion of both Meshri and Saleh at the 2018 Paris Summit, in theory these talks would be more comprehensive, by meeting with four representatives instead of two. Nonetheless, there are still multiple dimensions neglected through this approach.
Firstly, the Supreme State Council publically raised doubts about the outcomes of the French Summit due to their unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of Haftar within negotiations. For his part, Meshri called the Summit an “important step” but not “crucial”, citing a lack of attention to key issues such as the military operation in Dernah[10]. There are a multitude of possible reasons for this mutual lack of recognition, the aforementioned fighting in Dernah has proven to be a very public one. However it is interesting to note that Meshri represents the Justice and Construction Party, an Islamist party with documented links to the Muslim Brotherhood that has significant ideological divides with the anti-Islamist heads of the House of Representatives in the East[11]. It is probable that political agendas are at play here, and unsurprisingly, due to these mutual lacks of recognition of the legitimacy of the various actors, the Paris Agreement was never actually signed. Regardless, if there is to be real progress in Libya there needs to be a real willingness to engage in dialogue on good faith.
Secondly, even the accommodation of these four actors completely neglected representatives across the entirety of Libya. This includes the reported thirteen groups and councils from western Libya, some linked to the GNA, who publically rejected the outcomes of the Paris Summit[12]. Also, representatives from Libya’s third-largest city, Misrata, rejected a request to attend the Summit[13]. Additionally, representatives from the different groups controlling parts of Libya’s south, the various groups loyal to the former regime of deposed leader Muammar Gaddafi, and others such as representatives from Libyan civil society were completely absent. Any election process needs to truly represent all of Libya in order to be legitimate.
Necessity of Legal Provisions
The UNSMIL’s representative, Salame, proposed an Action Plan in 2017[14] that sought to amend the pre-existing Libyan Political Agreement signed in Schirat in 2015[15]. Here he insisted that the two rival governments provide for the conditions to hold a National Conference to consult Libyan citizens about their political future. This in turn would enable the drafting of an amended National Charter, the national constitution, which would then provide the legislation necessary for any future election process. This would then ensure that such an election process would have sufficient legal backing, whilst making sure that all actors would accept and abide by the results. However this process continues to be in deadlock due to an unwillingness to engage and compromise between actors, actors who which stand to potentially lose their power should the people vote for alternative representatives.
It is interesting that France has taken the reigns in holding this summit, and there are obvious reasons why this gamble, if successful, would be beneficial to Macron. Both domestic and international pressures to curb migration exist; from so-called humanitarian calls to reduce the numbers of casualties at sea, to the rising far-right anti-immigrant agenda lurking in the France’s domestic wings. However, by taking charge alone, does France risk undermining the consensus-based UN-led peace process? There are certainly risks of this, as noted by the International Crisis Group[16].
This new push by Macron for elections in Libya needs to have the original proposed constitutional reform underpinning the process. There is a real risk that yet another failed deadline will reinforce divisive narratives further; and there is a precedent here as the original talks between Sarraj and Haftar in 2017, both in Abu Dhabi and Paris, amounted to no concrete actions taken despite agreeing to a “ceasefire” then[17]. The recent reports from Sabha suggest this agreement was broken. Should we then expect this Summit to be any different, especially as the actors did not actually sign any official agreement? The outcomes of such a failed process would likely be, at the best, an even lengthier continuation of the current status quo of insecurity, or, at the worst, an escalation of armed confrontation between groups.
In The Challenge of Sustaining Peace[18], for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peace-Building Architecture, it was observed that one of the major factors attributed to unsuccessful peace-building operations in post-conflict countries is “undue haste, based on impractical timelines”, and that in order to create an environment of sustainable stability and security in post-conflict countries, the national institutions supporting the democratic process, such as constitutional reform, must be strengthened to a sufficient level. It proceeds further:
“Democratically held remain a laudable goal. But the process leading to them must be carefully and judiciously prepared, and must be able to rely on the credibility and support of the population through extended dialogue and outreach.”
We need to remember who the election process should actually be for: it is neither for of the four specific actors in Libya, nor for Salame and the UN, nor Macron and the French Government, rather elections should be for the people of Libya themselves so that they can determine their own future and exercise their own autonomy. Any alternative reason for elections will ultimately lead to failure.