As talks continue regarding proposed Presidential elections in Libya later this year, one relatively innocuous development was the April election of Khaled al-Mishri, of the Justice and Construction Party, to the Presidency of the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS)[1]. Why is this such a relevant development? The Justice and Construction Party represents the Muslim Brotherhood, the transnational Islamist movement that has been controversially designated as a terrorist organization in six countries[2]. The reasons why this came to be are also warnings of potential spoilers for the proposed upcoming Presidential elections, and are rooted in the history of the bureaucracy and ideological polarization in Libya’s transitional political structures.
2014: One Failed Election… Two Governments
After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, a National Transitional Council was established as a political front of the revolution that in turn developed into an elected General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012 that would meet in Tripoli in western Libya. Meanwhile in June 2013, with the backing of the Justice and Construction Party, Islamist candidate Nouri Abusahmein, the founder of the designated terror-group Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room[3], assumed the role of President of the GNC. The primary goal of the GNC was to establish a permanent democratic constitution[4], however due to continual political deadlock this task was unfulfilled during the 10-month period for which the GNC was supposed to exist. Consequently, the GNC was forced to organize new elections in June 2014 to establish a more permanent House of Representatives (HoR), which itself took power in August later that year, with its Chairman Aguila Saleh Issa at its head.
Unlike the 2012 elections for the GNC when turnout was a respectable 60% in the first elections post-Gaddafi, the 2014 elections for the HoR were only 18%, with the primary reasons for such a low turnout being issues of security[5]. Under new election laws, candidates for the HoR were all registered as independents, with no party affiliations, however this has not stopped some commentators from noting that the 2014 elections were dominated by representatives from secular and pro-nationalist candidates, whilst only around 30 seats out of 200 were won by Islamist candidates[6]. This was especially evident as many of the candidates were already affiliated with parties due to their former place within the GNC. One such Islamist party that lost out in the 2014 HoR elections was the Justice and Construction Party.
These Islamist parties that suffered defeat in the 2014 elections continued to convene as the GNC in Tripoli, rather than be in a minority in the HoR. They utilized the armed groups Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room and Central Shield to take control of the capital and suppress dissent[7]. They dismissed the then-Prime Minsiter Abdullah al-Thani, and de facto forced the HoR to relocate to the Eastern city of Tobruk. By November 2014, they had brought a case to the Libyan Supreme Court, also based in Tripoli that challenged the HoR election outcomes, which the Court, under considerable political pressure, declared unconstitutional [8]. The then-Islamist leader of the GNC, Abusahmain, announced the formation of a National Salvation Government (NSG) as the legitimate government of Libya based in Tripoli, appointing Omar al-Hassi, and then Khalifa al-Ghawi as its Prime Ministers. For their part, the HoR reinstated former Prime Minister Thani as the head of their executive in Bayda, Eastern Libya.
At this stage between late 2014 and early 2015, Libya had two different elected (albeit in differing years) governments, the GNC in the West and the HoR in the East, represented by Abusahmain and Saleh respectively. These in turn had differing executive branches claiming recognition as the Prime Ministers office for the State, Ghawi in Tripoli, and Thani in Bayda. And these divisions were not just based on West vs. East geography, but also ideology: Islamism vs. nationalism. Notably, around the central towns of Sirte, the transnational terror-group Daesh exploited the insecurity between these two factions to establish a foothold within Libya that would last until 2017.
2015: One UN Agreement, One New Government
In December 2015, within this context, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) brokered an agreement between members of the GNC and HoR in Schirat [9]. The Libyan Political Agreement established a new interim Government of National Accord, with Fayez al-Sarraj as Prime Minister. The former GNC would instead comprise a new advisory body, the High Council of State(HCS), whilst the HoR would continue to act as a legislative for the GNA. The GNA was given a two year deadline to implement a new constitutional reform process with the cooperation of the HoR and HCS followed by scheduled elections. Of course this settlement was not satisfactory to all parties involved. For instance, while the NSG officially disbanded in April 2016 with the GNC, members of the NSG including Ghawi fled to Misrata. From there, forces loyal to the NSG were involved with intermittent clashes with pro-GNA forces in Tripoli and its outskirts throughout 2017 [10] .
Meanwhile although the HoR, and Saleh, officially supported the GNA and Libyan Political Agreement, their position has been somewhat compromised due to their relation to Khalifa Haftar, and the Libyan National Army. These forces had occupied much of Eastern Libya during 2014, and their support for the HoR was key to stability in the East. They also were a significant presence in purging Sirte of Daesh in 2017. However, Haftar has refused to support the Libyan Political Agreement and recognize Sarraj and the GNA as legitimate [11] . Thus, rather than Saleh and the HoR or the symbol of Thani’s continued claim as Prime Minister in Bayda, Haftar’s military backing to the HoR can be seen as the main power in the East, and the purest representation of the Eastern secular/nationalist political tendency within Libya.
2018: One Election Deadline
And so the GNA has struggled to gain legitimacy, and consequently the constitutional reform processes that require the collaboration of GNA, HoR and HCS has been completely stalled. The two year deadline for implementing elections passed last year. Since then, France has taken the lead in pushing for a new election process by December of this year, though a conference between Sarraj, Haftar, Saleh and Mishri. Having said this, we can now return to the initial point regarding Mishri. In April 2018, Mishri was nominated to Chair the HCS. His relationship to the Justice and Construction Party , to the Muslim Brotherhood , and to political Islamism in general can be seen in this historical context as a continuation of the Islamism that has dominated Western Libya since the initial 2012 GNC elections. Perhaps he was nominated to be as pure a counter-weight to Haftar as possible? After all, one of the primary negotiating positions of the HCS has been the exclusion of Haftar from any future political process. Maybe this represents a continuation of Muslim Brotherhood power in Western Libya?
Whatever these reasons maybe we can see that the political polarization within Libya is continuing, and that the election of Mishri to the head of the HCS may be another example of political actors refusing to negotiate or compromise with others. If Libya’s post-Gaddafi history has shown anything, it is that a refusal to cooperate and concede power has impeded election outcomes in the past. Should we expect any different for the future if the leaders of key institutions continue to refuse to recognize one another? And can Libya survive yet another disputed election? Hopefully Mishri is able to push beyond the restrictions of ideology and political party, and instead cooperate for the best future of Libya as possible.