With the news from April 12th that General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and widely recognized as the primary challenger to the authority of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, was hospitalized in Paris[1], speculation has begun to grow regarding what this development will have on Libya’s political kaleidoscope.
Reports for some time remained unclear and unverified, with some going so far as to suggest that Haftar has in fact passed away[2]. But as of April 27th, Haftar reemerged in Benghazi to reassure that he “was in good health”, and that regarding rumors of his bad health, there are some individuals that “will answer for them in the appropriate way”[3]. This particular episode, and its consequent speculation has made a critical fact clear: the centralization of power in one man, who at 75 years has developed serious health problems, has exposed a flaw in the balance of Libya’s politics. The LNA needs Haftar at its head, without him the organization has faced a temporary crisis of both leadership and legitimacy as a major political power within Libya.
For instance, merely days after the news of Haftar’s condition broke, General Abdel-Razeq Nathouri, Haftar’s Chief of Staff and de-facto second-in command, survived a failed car-bombing assassination attempt outside of Benghazi[4]. As of yet, no group has claimed responsibility for this attack. For its part, the LNA claimed the bombing was perpetrated by a terrorist organization. They have instead preferred to focus attention away from their leadership to their ongoing military campaign in the city of Dernah, east of Benghazi and currently under control by the Shura Council militant group.
However, this has done little to stop speculation. Libyan[5] and international[6] news outlets in support of the GNA led by Fayez al-Sarraj have begun to question whether an internal power struggle within the LNA looms ahead. Some[7] have suggested that with the blow to the LNA’s leadership, and thus a blow to the Eastern-Tobruk government the House of Representatives (HoR) which the LNA backs and which has been directly contesting the authority of the GNA, the GNA can potentially seize the moment to put pressure on the HoR to reopen dialogue between the rival governments, and generally expand its influence into the East of Libya. So in this climate, with a powerful actor weakened, why should the GNA refrain from calling national elections to consolidate and legitimize its power? The answer is simple: Libya is still too fragile.
Any talk of elections in this climate must be approached with caution. If the GNA is depending upon the defeat of the LNA for nationwide elections, in order to avoid a substantial political challenger, the GNA would sacrifice much more. Since 2014 and Operation Dignity, the LNA has consolidated a hold over much of Libya’s east and south. This includes Benghazi, a city under the control of militias since the original war broke out that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. There is clear evidence that the LNA has also helped to purge some of Libya’s coastal towns and cities, including Benghazi, of the black flag of Daesh[8]. Without the stabilization of the LNA, much of Libya will likely fall into a security vacuum that these armed militias can again exploit. Secondly, evidence suggests that rather than the GNA, it is the LNA who has been the ones to begin to restart Libya’s oil economy, having gained control over oilfields once in the possession of militias[9]. The leader of Libya’s National Oil Company, Mustafa Sanalla, has stated that Libya as a State is losing around 750 million US dollars annually due to corruption, illegal smuggling and oil theft[10]. Similarly to the above point, it is possible that without the LNA, these oil fields would once again fall into the hands of militias and create massive setbacks for restarting Libya’s stagnant economy. Thirdly, the LNA enjoys support from both Libyan citizens on the ground, especially those freed from armed militias, as well as key international actors. It is likely that such allies would endeavor to maintain influence in the East of Libya by supporting any potential replacement, in order to keep the LNA in a position of power.
“Democracy at any cost” will fail to deliver the transition so desperately needed in Libya. Key differences between actors across all levels, especially Libyan citizens, need to be mediated carefully in open dialogue. The original stipulations of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement called for an agreed constitutional reform before any elections can be held. This process has been in deadlock between counter-claims of the GNA and HoR, but must not be abandoned. While the LNA alone is not the answer to Libya’s crises, neither should the GNA exploit its current weakness to push for premature elections. Currently, there seems to be an ever-increasing number of reports from key international actors regarding the desire for Libyan national elections by the end of the year[11]. But a desire for democracy is insufficient without good governance supporting the process behind its implementation. And to achieve this, all parties must carefully negotiate together to unify their fractured country.