In recent years, Gulf states – particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – have intensified engagement with African countries amid global geopolitical shifts. Historically tied through Islam, migration, and cultural exchange, relations were once informal but are now increasingly strategic. Africa’s fast-growing markets, resources, and geostrategic position make it central to Gulf states’ economic diversification beyond oil. However, each state follows distinct strategies: Saudi Arabia focuses on the Red Sea and food security, the UAE pursues expansive maritime, security, and investment projects while Qatar takes a selective, diplomacy-driven approach, centered on aviation and energy. For African countries, Gulf partnerships offer investment without heavy political conditions, while for Europe, this growing Gulf-Africa nexus poses both challenges and opportunities, particularly in areas like energy, security, and multilateral cooperation within an increasingly multipolar world.

The Gulf states engagement on the African continent: Preserving the three P’s

In recent years, Africa has become a central arena of geopolitical competition among major powers including the United States, European countries, China, and Russia driven by shifting dynamics in the international order. Against this backdrop, the continent has also emerged as a strategic priority for Gulf states. The foundations of Africa-Gulf relations are deeply rooted in shared history, religion, and culture. For centuries, Sub-Saharan African Muslims have crossed the Red Sea to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, facilitating not only spiritual connections but also sustained cultural exchange. The influence of the Arabic language in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti underscores the depth of these interactions. From the early 2000s onward, labor migration added a new dimension to this relationship. Large numbers of Africans sought employment opportunities in Gulf countries, particularly in UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, thereby strengthening people-to-people linkages.

However, these interactions remained largely organic, shaped by tradition and necessity rather than by strategic design or institutionalized cooperation. This dynamic has now shifted. Gulf states increasingly approach the African continent through the lens of long-term strategic interest. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are investing political, economic, and security capital to expand their presence on a continent that offers both rapidly growing markets and critical natural resources essential to sustaining their own economic diversification agendas                           thus evolved from a region of cultural affinity to one of deliberate policy engagement for Gulf actors.

The prospects for deeper economic engagement between the Gulf states and the African continent are reinforced by shifts in the global and regional order, marked by multi-complexity and the consolidation of multipolarity. Within this evolving landscape, Gulf governments are prioritizing investment-driven engagement with African partners, aiming to secure access to emerging markets while advancing long-term diversification strategies beyond hydrocarbons.

This geopolitical environment driven by conflicts such as the Ukraine war presents both risks and opportunities: On the one hand, it creates openings for Gulf states to assert national interests and recalibrate foreign policy priorities. On the other hand, the unpredictability of these dynamics has generated caution, with some Gulf governments seeking to reinforce traditional networks and established power structures as a hedge against uncertainty and to safeguard regime stability.

At the same time, Sub-Saharan African states are also recalibrating their external relations. While historically anchored to Western partners, many are now increasingly oriented toward Asia and the Gulf in search of investment, trade, and development support. This convergence of interests has created a new phase in Gulf-Africa relations in which traditional cultural and religious ties are supplemented by deliberate economic and strategic engagement.

Although Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar cannot be treated as a unified bloc given their divergent and sometimes competing strategies of external engagement, their approaches to power projection are underpinned by three core calculations, summarized as the three “P’s”:

1. Preserving political authority and regime legitimacy for ruling families.
2. Preserving sustainable economic progress through diversification beyond hydrocarbons.
3. Preserving regional stability as a prerequisite for national security.

This strategic outlook reflects what is often described as the ongoing “Gulf moment.” Since the Arab uprisings of 2010, when traditional Arab power centers such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq became mired in turmoil and protracted crises, the Gulf monarchies have stepped into the resulting vacuum. Leveraging vast energy resources and relatively resilient authoritarian governance systems, they have consolidated their position as emerging middle powers. In doing so, they have elevated their role not only within the Middle East but increasingly across adjacent regions, including the African continent.

The political and security dimension: Preserving regional stability and geoeconomic statecraft

Politically, the Gulf states are reshaping regional dynamics by pursuing a more autonomous and independent posture. Their approach combines seemingly contradictory elements such as confrontation and compromise, dialogue and demonization, engagement and exclusion depending on context and strategic necessity. This has given rise to a distinct pattern of foreign policy behavior characterized by intervention, multi-alignment, regional de-escalation, risk minimization, and omni-balancing.

At the core of this strategy lies a recognition of the growing geoeconomic interconnectivity and geopolitical interdependence of the wider region. For the Gulf monarchies, regional security is viewed not as an end in itself, but as a prerequisite for advancing economic diversification agendas. Consequently, de-escalation has emerged as a deliberate tool of statecraft as it reduces risks, preserves regime stability, and creates the conditions necessary to pursue long-term economic transformation.

Amid profound socioeconomic and sociocultural transformation, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia have increasingly shifted from confrontational postures toward cooperative and pragmatic engagement. This evolution is reflected in the embrace of multistakeholder diplomacy and polylateralism, which allow Gulf leaders to hedge risks, avoid entanglement in cycles of regional violence, and project influence through conflict mediation and multi-track diplomacy. By cultivating interlinkages between communication, representation, and negotiation, Gulf states have expanded their “niche diplomacy” capacities and demonstrated multidimensional agency across diverse arenas. Contemporary Gulf diplomacy, often described as an “intersection of realms,” functions as a conceptual toolbox: it connects actors from different regions, sectors, and disciplines, while drawing on instruments of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, and soft power. Concrete steps underscore this trend toward conflict management. The lifting of the intra-Gulf crisis in 2021, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, and the signing of the Abraham Accords by the UAE and Bahrain with Israel in 2020 exemplify deliberate efforts to de-escalate tensions and preserve the Gulf states’ core strategic priorities called the three “P’s.”

Qatar in particular has positioned itself as an active mediator, pursuing diplomatic initiatives in Africa as part of a broader strategy of foreign policy diversification. It has facilitated negotiations between Ethiopia and Sudan in 2010 following their border conflict, and between Djibouti and Eritrea in the same period. Most recently, in 2025, Doha brokered a deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, further consolidating its reputation as an “honest broker.” Complementing its mediation efforts, Qatar has expanded its public diplomacy in Africa, seeking to avoid overreliance on any single external partner while reinforcing its sovereignty and autonomy.

For Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea constitutes a strategic hinterland and is central to its geostrategic calculus. After an initial phase of assertive interventions and regional confrontation during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s early years in power (2015-2018), Riyadh shifted toward diplomatic reconciliation with rivals such as Iran, Turkey, and Qatar. This recalibration has been shaped not only by security imperatives but also by geoeconomic incentives and development ambitions. Saudi leadership increasingly views regional stability as essential to creating the conditions for economic diversification and to safeguarding high-profile initiatives such as Expo 2030 in Riyadh and the 2034 FIFA World Cup. Within this framework, sub-Saharan Africa has acquired growing significance. Saudi Arabia recognizes that advancing its domestic transformation agenda requires strong partnerships with East African states. The establishment of the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (Red Sea Council) in January 2020 illustrates this approach. Comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Yemen, the Council was designed to consolidate Saudi leadership at a time of regional turbulence marked by the Gulf crisis, strained relations with Iran, the COVID-19 pandemic, and heightened competition from external actors such as Turkey. Its objectives encompass enhancing economic, environmental, and security cooperation while tackling shared challenges such as piracy, smuggling, and irregular migration. Yet, the Council’s political outcomes have remained limited. Intraregional rivalries and unresolved disputes have constrained its effectiveness. Ethiopia’s exclusion, primarily due to its confrontation with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), has not only undermined Saudi–Ethiopian relations but also weakened the Council’s credibility as an inclusive regional framework. As a result, Saudi Arabia’s ambition to project sustained leadership over the Red Sea arena has encountered structural obstacles.

For the UAE, engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa is shaped by a hybrid model that combines personal networks, nation branding, economic statecraft, and a transactional approach to security and investment. Central to this strategy is the investment-security nexus, which links commercial expansion is closely to geostrategic and military objectives. Maritime security is at the core of the UAE’s Africa policy. Given the Emirati economy’s reliance on global connectivity, secure energy supply chains, and unhindered maritime flows, the Red Sea occupies a pivotal role in its strategic outlook. The waterway connects two critical routes: the Red-Med corridor (linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean) and the Red-Indian corridor (connecting the Red Sea to the Western Indian Ocean). These maritime arteries underpin both commercial activities such as investments in ports and logistics infrastructure and geopolitical ambitions, including control of sea lanes and expansion of military reach. The UAE’s involvement in Yemen and its wider Red Sea initiatives underscore the region’s significance for its cross-regional agenda.

As a consequence, the UAE has emerged as the Gulf’s most assertive actor in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in fragile or conflict-affected states such as Sudan and Ethiopia. It combines security assistance with political influence, positioning itself as both a partner in counterterrorism and a power broker. Between 2016 and 2024, Abu Dhabi signed eight counterterrorism agreements with Somalia, Puntland, Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Kenya, and Mozambique. These arrangements included the delivery of military training, equipment, and weapons sometimes to state actors, and at times to non-state groups aligned with Emirati interests. For example, the UAE has faced accusations of supplying drones to Ethiopian forces during the Tigray conflict and of providing training to the Republican Guard, an elite unit formed in 2018 to protect Ethiopia’s prime minister, reflecting the depth of personal ties between Ethiopian and Emirati leaders. In January 2025, the UAE deepened this partnership further when experts from the Dubai Police and the Ministry of Interior trained Ethiopia’s Federal Police in cybercrime investigations, VIP protection, and counterterrorism. Beyond Ethiopia, the UAE has steadily expanded its defense cooperation and commercial footprint across the continent. Since the 2010s, countries including the DRC, Angola, Tanzania, Somaliland, Egypt, Senegal, and Mozambique have signed port concession agreements with Emirati companies such as DP World and AD Ports Group. These commercial ventures often paved the way for security cooperation and defense industry partnerships. In 2018, Kenya purchased helicopters from the UAE to support counterinsurgency operations against al-Shabaab, while in 2019, Global Aerospace Logistics (GAL), part of the EDGE defense conglomerate, concluded a maintenance and overhaul agreement with the Kenya Air Force.

African states, for their part, increasingly seek deeper engagement with Gulf partners to address pressing security challenges and to expand trade and investment opportunities. The relationship is underpinned by a set of shared security concerns that directly affect both regions. These include protracted conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, instability in Libya, and unresolved tensions in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa. The consequences of these conflicts extend beyond immediate security concerns. Humanitarian crises have generated waves of forced migration, with Gulf states increasingly serving as destinations for displaced populations. At the same time, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden remain highly vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, and geopolitical competition. Within this evolving context, there is both a strategic necessity and an opportunity to foster mutually beneficial synergies. By aligning African states’ demand for investment, infrastructure, and conflict management with Gulf states’ objectives of securing trade routes, mitigating regional risks, and diversifying economic partnerships, the two regions can consolidate a cooperative agenda that is responsive to the shifting global and regional order.

Economic engagement: The Gulf states as new superpowers in Africa

Confronted with volatile oil prices and the structural imperative of economic diversification, Gulf states increasingly view the African continent as both a growth market and an attractive investment location. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been particularly proactive, channeling capital into sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, mining, and energy as those sectors align closely with their domestic diversification agendas. Of special significance are investments in renewable energy and critical minerals, which form the backbone of the Gulf’s economic engagement with Africa and are vital to global energy transitions. This strategy is driven by powerful state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. Energy champions such as ACWA Power, Masdar, QatarEnergy, and Saudi Aramco, alongside sovereign wealth funds like Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, play a central role in advancing investment projects that support economic transformation, expand market access, and reinforce strategic partnerships.

For the Gulf monarchies, Africa also represents a gateway for geoeconomic power projection. By positioning themselves as credible and reliable partners, Gulf states pursue what can be described as a “geoeconomic turn,” leveraging foreign direct investment (FDI) to create jobs at home, expand trade corridors, and enhance their global standing. This strategy is reinforced by nation branding and place branding efforts, framed through cultural diplomacy and soft power, which seek to present the Gulf as a model of stability, modernity, and opportunity.

With an emphasis on economic expansion mainly in energy and maritime logistics, the UAE has consolidated its position as Africa’s leading Gulf investor and views Sub-Saharan Africa as a cornerstone of its “business first” strategy. Between 2012 and 2022, the UAE invested approximately USD 101.9 billion across 628 projects. From 2019 to 2023, Emirati commitments exceeded USD 110 billion, including USD 97 billion in just 2022-2023. This makes the UAE the largest Gulf investor in Africa, accounting for around 60% of all Gulf capital inflows into East Africa, and the fourth-largest global source of investment, after the European Union, China, and the United States. The growing presence of companies from African countries in the UAE further reflects this deepening relationship: registrations with the Dubai Chamber rose by 15.5% since 2019, reaching 32,000 by 2023. The Chamber has also expanded its footprint on the continent, opening offices in Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa to facilitate bilateral trade and investment flows.

Maritime infrastructure remains at the heart of the UAE’s Africa strategy. Through DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports Group (ADPG), the UAE has invested heavily in African ports, enhancing trade networks and securing access to key markets. Since 2006, the two firms have operated 13 port facilities across the continent, often in partnership with international players such as the UK’s CDC Group and India’s Adani Ports. DP World has played a particularly prominent role, securing concessions in Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosaso (Somalia) and developing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Berbera. Today, DP World manages six ports (in Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Tanzania) and two dry ports (in Rwanda and South Africa), with new projects under way in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal.

Memorandums of understanding with Namibia and Senegal on SEZ development further underscore the UAE’s ambition to control trade corridors and reinforce its economic influence across the continent. This “string of ports” approach is central to the UAE’s wider geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy. By linking African facilities with Dubai’s Jebel Ali port—the core hub connecting Africa and Asia—the UAE is embedding Africa into its interconnectivity agenda. Investments in SEZs, railways, logistics facilities, and pipelines further complement this vision. A flagship example is the 2023 agreement with Morocco to co-invest in the Atlantic gas pipeline, designed to transport Nigerian gas to North Africa and ultimately Europe.

In the energy sector, Abu Dhabi pursues a dual-track strategy: on the one hand, it advances green energy alternatives, while on the other, it maintains a gradual transition from fossil fuels by continuing to supply refined oil. Leading Emirati clean energy companies such as Dubai-based AMEA Power, Abu Dhabi-based Masdar, and the Egyptian-Emirati joint venture Infinity Power have been central to renewable energy expansion across the continent.

In 2023, Emirati firms announced six major green hydrogen projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. The largest of these is a landmark USD 34 billion green hydrogen facility in Mauritania, a collaboration between Infinity Power, German developer Conjuncta, and the Mauritanian government, designed to deliver 10GW of capacity. AMEA Power has also committed to installing 1GW of green hydrogen capacity in Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mauritania, while simultaneously operating or developing energy plants across Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda. Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) complements these efforts with projects in Morocco, Senegal, and South Africa and is involved in a USD 10 billion renewable energy investment initiative across sub-Saharan Africa.

In parallel, the UAE has targeted mineral extraction to support emerging technologies, including the AI and clean energy sectors. In 2023, Abu Dhabi’s F9 Capital Management partnered with South Africa’s Q Global Commodities (QGC) to produce green metals such as lithium, nickel, and copper, with QGC operations spanning South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, and Namibia. In 2024, the UAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Kenya to collaborate on mining and technology, covering mineral exploration, mine development, processing, refining, and marketing, particularly in Kenya’s copper and tantalum sectors. That same year, the Emirati International Resources Holding Company (IRH) invested over USD 1 billion to acquire a 51% stake in Zambia’s Mopani Copper Mines, with plans to expand further into Angola, Burundi, the DRC, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

Unlike the UAE’s more diversified engagement, Saudi investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are comparatively concentrated and transactional, with a particular emphasis on mining and agriculture as those sectors are critical to the kingdom’s long-term food security and economic transformation. Yet, amid rising domestic pressure to advance socioeconomic diversification, Saudi investment strategies in the region are becoming increasingly structured and aligned with broader geoeconomic objectives.

Between 2018 and 2023, Saudi investments in East Africa expanded from USD 4.9 billion to an estimated USD 15.6 billion, largely directed toward energy, infrastructure, and agriculture. Djibouti has emerged as the principal hub, attracting nearly USD 13 billion and representing roughly 90% of all Gulf inflows into the country. Over the past two decades, Sudan has also become a cornerstone of Saudi commercial engagement, with cumulative investments of USD 35.7 billion, positioning it as the kingdom’s most important market in the Horn of Africa. Looking ahead, Saudi Arabia has signalled its intention to strengthen its presence in Africa’s strategic mineral sector.

In 2024, Riyadh announced a USD 15 billion commitment to global mining assets, with a specific focus on securing critical mineral supplies from Namibia, Guinea, and the DRC. A memorandum of understanding with the DRC is already in place, while Ma’aden, in partnership with the PIF, launched the joint venture Manara Minerals to accelerate mineral acquisitions. Manara has since placed a bid for a 30% stake in Zambia’s copper mines, owned by Canada’s First Quantum Minerals, underscoring the kingdom’s proactive approach to embedding itself in Africa’s mining value chains. These moves reflect Saudi Arabia’s strategic intent to reduce its dependence on crude oil, expand export markets for Saudi goods in Sub-Saharan Africa, and leverage economic engagement as a tool of soft power diplomacy.

Finally, Qatar has adopted a more selective and cautious approach to engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, concentrating on sectors that align closely with its national priorities and comparative advantages, notably liquefied natural gas (LNG) and aviation. As of 2020, only 18 major Qatari investment projects have been recorded in the Horn of Africa, valued at roughly USD 600 million (12 in Ethiopia, four in Sudan, and two in South Sudan). Looking ahead, Doha has expressed ambitions to expand significantly, with a reported multi-billion volume earmarked for African markets including Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Gabon.

Rwanda represents the centrepiece of Qatari engagement in East Africa. Qatar Airways has committed USD 1.3 billion to develop the Bugesera International Airport, located 40 kilometres south of Kigali, holding a 60% stake in the project. Negotiations are also underway for Qatar Airways to acquire a 49% stake in RwandAir, alongside investments in Air Botswana and South Africa’s Airlink. These aviation-focused ventures account for approximately 75% of Qatar’s total investment portfolio in East Africa.

Beyond Rwanda, Qatar has diversified its engagement through infrastructure and service delivery projects. The telecommunications firm Ooredoo has financed water supply systems, road networks, hospitals, municipal facilities, and digital infrastructure. Doha has also backed renewable energy projects in Kenya and invested in start-ups and fintech ventures, most notably Airtel Mobile Commerce, the mobile money arm of Airtel Africa. While investments in maritime infrastructure and port concessions have been more limited compared to the UAE, Qatar made notable attempts to expand in this sector. In 2018, amid the Gulf crisis, Doha signed a USD 4 billion agreement with Turkey to develop Sudan’s Suakin Island port, though the project was suspended in 2019 after the fall of President Omar al-Bashir. Similarly, plans for a new port in Hobyo, Somalia, have stalled due to political instability.

Overall, Qatar’s Africa strategy reflects a measured but strategic pursuit of influence, leveraging aviation and energy as its principal entry points while cautiously expanding into infrastructure and digital services. Although smaller in scale than Saudi or Emirati investments, Qatari projects remain highly targeted, signalling Doha’s intent to consolidate its niche strengths while managing risk exposure in politically volatile environments

Implications for Europe: Chances and Challenges for Enhanced Cooperation

As African and Gulf countries negotiate and reconfigure their mutual interactions, this changing environment presents some challenges for European stakeholders on an economic, political, and normative level:

• Economically, Europe faces an uneven playing field for African partners, as the Gulf states‘ state-backed and flexible investment model offers faster procedures, less conditionality in normative ways and higher risk tolerance than Europe’s often cumbersome funding processes. Gulf firms often operate under softer standards on financial transparency, regulatory boundaries, and sustainability, making them more appealing to African governments. Over time, this could reduce European companies’ access to crucial resources and weaken their position in emerging markets. Geostrategically, in particular the UAE’s control of ports in several African countries increases leverage over trade routes, at a moment when shipping lanes around Africa are shifting. The UAE’s growing partnerships with China and Russia further amplify risks for Europe: joint ventures, such as the EGA–Chinalco refinery deal in Guinea, may consolidate Chinese control of renewable value chains, while cooperation with Russia strengthens networks that undermine European influence. Normatively, the Gulf states’ supportive stance toward fossil fuel investments aligns with African growth models and diverges from Europe’s decarbonization priorities. This convergence could weaken Europe’s energy transition diplomacy and stall broader green industrial ambitions.
• Politically, ties between the Gulf states, African states and Europe have unavoidably been affected by the changing global circumstances, which has occasionally resulted in tensions, especially when it comes to power projection by various actors, regional influence, alliance-making, geopolitical ascendancy, and economic rivalry. In this regard, the reputation of Europe has diminished in recent years across the African continent and the Gulf states. Amid an era of multipolarity and partnership diversification, both Gulf states and African countries seek to promote multi-alignment indicated by the expansion of the BRICS group which was joined by new African members such as Ethiopia as well as the UAE in January 2024. For many in Europe, the expansion of BRICS+ presents a global order that is fragmenting into competing blocs, thanks to intensifying geopolitical rivalry between East and West and growing mutual alienation between North and South. Hence, inclusion in the BRICS+ bloc of the UAE alongside Ethiopia and Iran signals a commitment by emerging and middle powers from the ‘Global South’ toward mutually accelerated economic growth, sustainable development, and a more representative, reinvigorated, and reformed multilateral system. It represents the growing recognition of South-South cooperation to further catalyze economic relations between GCC and Sub-Sahara African countries and present a major force in global economic governance.

Such shifts and growing relevance of Gulf states in Africa require from Europe to adjust how to interact with Africa. The continent has emerged as a geostrategic and geoeconomic priority for both the European Union (EU) and its member states, but a consistent strategy is lacking which also results in diminishing leverage and agency.

Despite such challenges, Europe retains several competitive advantages:

• Its established investments, regulatory stability, and technological expertise provide credibility as a partner in energy innovation and governance. These attributes offer African governments and investors a more predictable framework compared to other actors’ more flexible but less transparent models. Cooperation rather than competition should be thus promoted between Gulf states, African partners and European stakeholders to push sustainable and long-term regional development.
• Trilateral cooperation would not only mitigate risks for Europe but also accelerate renewable deployment, improve energy access, create jobs, build networks, and stabilize investment environments. Crucially, it would also demonstrate responsiveness to African priorities and the global south’s growth-climate interdependencies, enabling Europe to reconsolidate influence and legitimacy. Here, coordinated efforts for Europe to engage with Gulf states and African partners in projects related to energy diversification, climate action, education and capacity development, female and youth empowerment, sustainable energy investments, AI and fintech, start-up and entrepreneurship promotion as well as sport diplomacy and joint security engagement could facilitate enhanced cooperation on a multilateral level.
• By engaging through multilateral platforms such as the African Union, Europe could reestablish trust and business partnerships. Such cooperation may further include joint ventures in renewable hydrogen, critical infrastructure, and financing mechanisms, underpinned by structured political dialogue. A coordinated EU framework, spearheaded by the European Commission in partnership with leading member states such as France, Germany, and Italy, could thus become crucial for managing Europe’s strategic response to the Gulf states‘ growing influence in Africa.
• In this regard, the EU should lead high-level diplomatic dialogue, collaborating with member states and representatives from finance and industry to deploy European technical, financial, and political expertise. Leveraging the EU-GCC strategic partnership, Europe can extend energy and climate cooperation with the Gulf states to African countries, especially in clean energy access. Furthermore, trilateral cooperation among financial institutions can unlock greater public and private investment, addressing Africa’s finance gap. Interconnectivity provides another instrument for closer European-Gulf-African cooperation: The UAE’s active role in port and logistics via DP World and ADP or Saudi Arabia’s logistical investments as part of ‘Vision 2030’ align with EU ambitions under Global Gateway, enabling joint strategic projects such as the Maputo-Walvis Bay corridor and Lobito Corridor.
• In terms of development cooperation, Gulf states are closely aligning their investment strategies with the provision of technical assistance. This shift in aid policies also reflects European interests in times of declining international humanitarian assistance and could provide potential for trilateral or multilateral financing of projects related to female and women empowerment, water and sanitation, education, and skills development in African countries.
• Finally, Europe and the Gulf states could significantly enhance cooperation on migration management by jointly addressing structural drivers of insecurity for migrants, improving labor conditions, and advancing cross-regional coordination. Building on the example of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue which convenes Asian countries of origin alongside GCC states, a similar multilateral forum could be established to include key African countries of origin and transit, such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria, together with Gulf partners. Such a framework, underpinned by joint diplomacy, financing, and infrastructure, would enable Europe to share risks and costs with Gulf states, leverage complementary strengths, and unlock new commercial and political opportunities. Coordinated engagement of this kind would not only advance safer migration pathways but also align with Europe’s energy security, climate commitments, and broader geoeconomic objectives, while strengthening diplomatic ties and addressing African development priorities.

In conclusion, a complementary approach, drawing on European regulatory and technological strengths, Gulf states’ financial capacity and connectivity, and African countries’ resource endowments, skilled labor and established networks, could yield mutual benefits.