Despite the fragile ceasefire, the war in the Gulf is poised to significantly reshape engagement between Gulf states and the Horn of Africa, with the Red Sea emerging as both a critical trade corridor and an increasingly contested geopolitical arena. This dual role intensifies the interconnectedness of security, economic, and political dynamics across both regions. While heightened tensions, particularly involving Iran and non-state actors such as the Houthis, risk destabilizing maritime routes and regional economies, they may also create new opportunities for enhanced cooperation within an increasingly fragmented global order.

The Red Sea as Corridor and Conflict Zone

Over the past decades, key Gulf actors, notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE),Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have transitioned from informal, culturally rooted relationships with African partners to structured and strategic engagement.This shift reflects a broader Gulf moment, in which these states are consolidating their roles as emerging middle powers.Over time, their engagement is motivated by strategic interests such as interconnectivity, infrastructure development, and investment flows, and driven by networkability,maneuverability and leveragability (the NML nexus) as conceptual instruments to gain leverage and preserve agency. Here, networkability refers to the construction of infrastructure, logistics corridors, and connectivity networks, including ports, energy systems, and digital infrastructure.Maneuverability captures the ability of Gulf states to maintain strategic flexibility through diversified alliances and adaptive foreign policy approaches whereas leveragability includes the capacity to translate economic and political investments into influence over regional and international outcomes.

However,the current war threatens to constrain the NML nexus simultaneously and thus creates a “Zeitenwende moment”  - a shift in strategic thinking and structural political reconfigurations – for both the Gulf states and African countries. Network ability is undermined by maritime insecurity,maneuverability is reduced by escalating geopolitical polarization, and leveragability declines as financial and political resources are increasingly redirected toward domestic security priorities. As a consequence, deep interdependence based on the NML nexus means that Gulf conflicts increasingly spill over into African contexts – as the current war shows in several dimensions.

The Security Dimension:How Gulf Instability Impacts Africa

Security spillovers represent the most immediate and visible consequence of Gulf instability. The Yemen-Horn of Africa nexus has re-emerged as a central axis of escalation. The Horn of Africa is particularly exposed due to its proximity to critical choke points such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait and its growing integration into Gulf-led economic and security networks. In terms of regional security, the Red Sea has evolved into a hybrid space where commerce and conflict intersect. It facilitates a significant share of global trade while simultaneously serving as a theater for geopolitical competition involving regional and global powers. The current war reinforces this dual function and intensifies the risks associated with it. The recent military involvement of the Houthis in Yemen, particularly their demonstrated capacity to disrupt maritime traffic, illustrates how non-state actors can exert disproportionate influence over global supply chains. As shown between 2023 and 2025, their attacks on shipping routes and renewed targeting of Israel underscore their strategic leverage in the region.

Asa close ally of Iran, the Houthis present themselves as a powerful force to undermine Israel’s regional power and they also want to show solidarity with the Palestinians. Here, a potential blockade of the Babal-Mandab Strait would severely disrupt energy flows and trade, affecting not only Gulf economies but also global markets.

For Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, a potential spike in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea creates a structural dilemma: On the one hand, Riyadh has attempted to stabilize relations with the Houthis in order to secure its southern border from renewed Houthi attacks and protect its economic diversification projects. On the other hand, it faces increasing pressure from broader regional escalation. If Red Sea maritime routes become untenable,alternative export pathways such as the East-West Crude Pipeline from Saudi Arabia’s East coast to Yanbu at the Red Sea may also lose viability, thereby constraining Saudi Arabia’s strategic maneuverability and its relative flexibility in exporting its oil through the Red Sea. The Houthis involvement could also have serious implications on Horn countries: Somaliland’s growing alignment with the UAE, combined with Israel’s recognition in December 2025, has heightened its exposure to the current conflict. Hence, Somaliland could become a potential target for the Houthis amid broader regional escalation. Additionally, US bases in Horn countries such as Djibouti could also be attacked. At the same time, Gulf-Iran tensions may extend into African diplomatic arenas.Countries that maintain pragmatic relations with Iran, such as Kenya, Uganda,Mali, or South Africa, could face increasing pressure from Gulf partners to recalibrate their foreign policies. This dynamic raises the possibility that parts of Africa could once again become arenas for indirect geopolitical competition.

The Economic Dimension: How the War Damages African Economic Interests

Economic spillovers are equally significant. Trade relations between the Gulf states and African partners are characterized by mutual dependence, with Gulf states exporting fuel and fertilizers essential for African transport, energy, and agricultural systems, while African countries supply food commodities, minerals, and gold that are critical to Gulf diversification and food security strategies.Disruptions in maritime and air transport further increase costs across these supply chains, leading to inflationary pressures and economic strain, particularly in urban centers. Rising prices for fuel, food, and transportation are already contributing to social unrest in multiple African cities such as Nairobi, Lagos, Accra,Antananarivo, Maputo, Marrakech, and Agadir.

Investment flows constitute another key dimension of interdependence. Gulf states have become major investors in Sub-Saharan Africa, channeling capital through sovereign wealth funds and state-linked enterprises to advance geoeconomic objectives. For instance, Emirati companies announced projects in Africa totaling USD 110 billion between 2019 and 2023, of which more than USD 70 billion was allocated to renewable energy projects in Ethiopia or Mauritania. The UAE has also made substantial investments in African infrastructure, most notably through state-owned logistical operators such as DP World, which operates six ports across the continent, as well as in sectors such as agriculture, telecommunications, and mining.In 2024, Saudi Arabia announced that investments in Africa are expected to climb to roughly USD 25 billion over the next ten years. By 2023, Saudi investment across the continent had already exceeded USD 13 billion, with officials noting that 47Saudi firms were operating in African markets, such as ACWA Power, which invested in energy projects in South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco. However, the war introduces new constraints on these investment patterns. Increased domestic spending on defense and reconstruction may reduce the availability of capital for foreign investments, while heightened risk perceptions are likely to result in more selective investment strategies focused on high-return and strategically critical sectors. Although a complete withdrawal from African markets is unlikely, a shift toward more cautious and risk-sensitive engagement could slow economic momentum in key regions.

The Diplomatic Dimension: How the Gulf States’ Mediating Role in African Conflicts is affected

Diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts are also affected. In particular, Qatar has positioned itself as a powerful mediator and facilitator in regional conflicts such as between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Yet the current war alters the risk calculus associated with such roles. Mediators such as Qatar have been targeted by Israel and Iran because they engaged in mediation. In addition to its facilitation efforts, Qatar also hosts the US military base in Al Udeid, has emerged as the second-largest foreign military sales partner to the US after Saudi Arabia and has been declared non-NATO ally of the US already in 2022 under Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden. Thus, the erosion of neutrality in an increasingly polarized environment undermines their credibility. As a result, diplomatic engagement in African conflicts may decline, potentially creating gaps in conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Migration Dimension: How the War could undermine Social Resilience

Migration dynamics further illustrate the depth of interdependence. Five million Africans are working and living across the Gulf. African diasporic communities play a crucial role in sustaining remittance flows,investment linkages, and broader socio-economic connections. Economic disruptions in the Gulf, including reduced employment opportunities, could trigger return migration on a scale similar to that observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such developments would reduce remittance inflows, increase domestic economic pressure in countries of origin, and strain social systems on both sides of the Red Sea.

The Role of Europe: Limited but Necessary

In light of the ongoing escalation, increased African agency will play a critical role in shaping how African states respond to Gulf instability. Rather than being passive recipients of external shocks, they are likely to adopt adaptive strategies that prioritize flexibility and strategic autonomy. In this regard,future Gulf-African relations will likely be characterized by a stronger emphasis on risk management, more selective investment strategies, and an increased focus on security cooperation. Regional frameworks such as the Red Sea Council may be revitalized to coordinate responses to shared challenges.Such a scenario could also pave the way for limited but constructive European engagement in close coordination with Gulf states and African partners.

For Europe, maritime security, free trade corridors, and controlled migration flows remain key to preserving strategic interests. In this regard, stability of the Red Sea and de-escalation at the Horn of Africa are crucial, which requires mutual engagement and diplomacy combined with economic statecraft and military action. Together with Arab partners such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, European states should evolve their current naval deployments, such as ASPIDES mission,into a standing, properly funded maritime security framework in the Red Sea. Those efforts should go beyond basic escort and surveillance to include mine countermeasures, air and missile defense, and the safeguarding of vital infrastructure such as ports, coastal export facilities, offshore energy assets, and sub sea communication cables. At the same time, European players,Gulf investors, and African partners should adopt risk-differentiated investment strategies that allow continued engagement in African markets while incorporating more robust political risk assessments and sectoral diversification.Maintaining diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts will also be essential,although this may require operating through multilateral frameworks and aligning different strategies to mitigate risks.

Furthermore, the war has caused financial and economic damage to the Gulf states’ business model. It is expected that GDP growth is likely to decline by up to 8.5%, equivalent to USD 168 billion, in the upcoming years. There construction of oil and gas refineries, desalination plants, and other infrastructure might take years. As a consequence,unemployment is estimated to increase by 3.6%up to 9.4% in the Gulf countries. Therefore, due to the long-term damage to their national economies and the need to upgrade their defense systems, Gulf states will have to allocate substantial financial resources domestically and reduce their foreign investments and humanitarian assistance. As a consequence, geopolitical leverage of Gulf states thorugh aid policies might decline – in particular in African countries. This will also affect both the willingness and the capacity of the Gulf states to finance large-scale reconstruction efforts inconflict-torn African countries, or limit their strategic investment to top priority markets, which could also impact African countries such as Ethiopia or South Africa, in which Gulf states have heavily invested in recent years. Here,European countries could promote closer cooperation and coordination with Gulf states to create synergy effects in times of limited financial resources.

Finally,Gulf states, African governments, and Europe could implement policies that stabilize employment for African workers in order to safeguard remittance flow sand socio-economic stability. In this regard, joint efforts to improve migration management and reduce structural violence against African migrants exposed to uncertainty in times of conflict could further strengthen trilateral European-African-Gulf cooperation through forums such as the Doha Dialogue and in coordination with international organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

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